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A Narrative of Sovereignty:
Illuminating the Paradox of the
Domestic Dependent Nation
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"In my view, the tribes either are or are not separate sover-
eigns, and our federal Indian law cases untenably hold both
positions simultaneously."'
"The [U.S.] Constitution never took away Indian self-govern-
ance; that governance flows from the people. The Courts are
trying to do what the [executive and legislative] branch[es]
have learned they cannot do-eliminate tribes." 2
D oes American Indian tribal sovereignty exist? In some
sense it is a strange question to ask. More than 540 feder-
ally recognized American Indian tribes function as sovereign na-
tions in many significant respects. To the members of these
tribes and to many non-members who spend time in Indian coun-
try, the answer is a resounding "yes." Yet the doctrine of Ameri-
can Indian tribal sovereignty is a legal and conceptual
conundrum. "Domestic dependent nations," as Justice John
Marshall famously labeled Indian tribes,3 are unique and para-
doxical constructions. Sovereignty ordinarily entails powers of
self-protection for which a nation-state requires no positive legal
authority, as well as the right of a state to exercise power freely
within its territory.4 American case law, however, has limited
tribal governmental authority to domestic and internal matters,
and has declared that even these powers are subject to defea-
sance by Congress.6 Because of these limitations and the often
inscrutable way in which the Supreme Court arrives at them, the
legal construct of Indian tribal sovereignty has been subject to
much criticism, including most recently by members of the Court
itself. In United States v. Lara, a case affirming Congress's power
to recognize inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-mem-
ber Indians,7 Justice Thomas concurred in the result but wrote
separately to decry what he sees as the contradictory premises
1 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
2 Telephone Interview with Raymond C. Etcitty, Navajo Nation Legislative Coun-
sel (July 7, 2003) (on file with author).
3 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
4 See F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 1, 3-5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (1966);
Eric Ting-Lun Huang, The Modern Concept of Sovereignty, Statehood and Recogni-
tion: A Case Study of Taiwan, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 99, 110-13 (2003).
5 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 581-82 (1832).
6 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-67 (1903).
7 "Non-member Indians" refers to American Indians who are members of a tribe
different from the one attempting to assert jurisdiction over them. The term "non-
members" elsewhere in this Article may also refer both to non-member Indians and
non-Indians. Sometimes federal Indian law treats all non-members identically, and
sometimes distinctions are made between non-member Indians and non-members
who are not Indians.
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that lie at the heart of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.8 Justice
Thomas suggested that one solution is for the Supreme Court to
declare that tribal sovereignty does not exist.9
Such a declaration would be met with shock and outrage by
many members of tribal nations for whom "sovereignty" is as
common and heartfelt a term as "rights" is to most other Ameri-
cans. Many tribal members perceive that their cultural survival is
inextricably linked to their existence as separate, self-governing
nations, and that dealing a final blow to the legal doctrine of sov-
ereignty would be akin to terminating tribal people themselves.
Former Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation Robert Yazzie, in tes-
timony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, put
it this way: "In short, the Navajo Nation is faced with nothing less
than a threat of cultural, economic, and political genocide."1 °
These are strong words, particularly when aimed at the least dan-
gerous branch of government, one that sits at quiet remove from
the daily struggles for survival in Indian country.
How can we account for the gap between Justice Thomas and
Justice Yazzie? A critique of the legal doctrine is not enough.
What is required is a narrative of sovereignty that informs courts,
legislators, and the public about what tribal sovereignty actually
looks like on the ground and why it matters. This Article pro-
vides that narrative by examining the interplay between U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions defining the contours of tribal sovereignty
and actions by and within the Navajo Nation regarding its sover-
eignty from 1970 to 2003. In studying the legal and political de-
velopments within the Navajo Nation, this Article addresses the
following questions: What impacts have U.S. Supreme Court de-
cisions had on the development of the Navajo Nation's political
and legal systems? How, in turn, have the functions of Navajo
sovereignty been affected? Those functions include concerns of
practical governance, such as providing economic opportunities
and peace and security, as well as the more elusive expressive
aspects associated with preserving a distinct and endemic culture.
Providing a narrative of sovereignty is particularly salient now
8 541 U.S. 193, 213-26 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 216-19.
10 Testimony of Honorable Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the Navajo Nation
Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Regarding the Impact and Af-
fect of the Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Navajo Sovereignty 4 (Feb. 27,
2002), available at http://indian.senate.gov/2002hrgs/022702trust/022702scourt-
wit.htm [hereinafter Testimony of Chief Justice Yazzie].
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due to the active role that the Supreme Court is taking in defin-
ing tribal governmental powers. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari on a surprisingly disproportionate number of Indian
law cases during the last several decades. 1 The Court's recent
decisions in these cases have left scholars with ample questions
concerning the constitutional12 and common law 3 underpinnings
of the Court's reasoning, and much scholarly attention has been
devoted to addressing these questions. The cases have also left
scholars and tribal advocates with the more practical problem of
how to respond to the Court's narrowing of tribal powers.' 4 The
Court's activity and the legal and practical questions it raises
highlight the need for an engaged discussion about what tribal
sovereignty is in practice, how it is affected by Supreme Court
decisions, and why it matters. Virtually no scholarship has ad-
dressed these questions directly.'5 As Phil Frickey has noted,
11 David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 292 (2001)
(noting that in the last four decades, the Supreme Court has decided a "surprisingly
high percentage of Indian cases"); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at
a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1268-
72 (2001) (discussing and charting the number of Indian law cases decided since
1991).
12 See L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty After Atkin-
son and Hicks, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 669, 674-75 (2003) (arguing that the absence of
constitutional underpinnings to tribal inherent sovereignty explains the Supreme
Court's reluctance to recognize tribal control over non-members); Joseph William
Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 657-59 (2003) (asserting that inherent tribal sovereignty is
recognized and affirmed in the Constitution); David E. Wilkins, A Constitutional
Confession: The Permanent If Malleable Status of Indigenous Nations, 37 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 473, 482 (2003) (discussing uncertainties in tribal status that stem in part
from contradictory constitutional rulings with respect to tribes).
13 See generally Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism:
The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J.
1 (1999); Getches, supra note 11.
14 See Gould, supra note 12, at 691-92 (suggesting a congressional fix that would
restore tribal territorial sovereignty in exchange for tribes incorporating many as-
pects of the U.S. Constitution into their governmental structure); Frank Pommer-
sheim, Is There a (Little, or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in Federal
Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 284-85 (2003) (proposing
congressional restoration of tribal inherent powers and, ultimately, a constitutional
amendment protecting sovereignty); see also Singer, supra note 12, at 667 (stating
that the Supreme Court should stop unilaterally divesting tribes of inherent powers;
any perceived unfairness to non-members should be redressed by Congress, which
has the power to require federal judicial review of tribal court decisions).15 See Robert B. Porter, Cleaning Up the Colonizer's Mess: An Important Role for
Legal Scholarship About the Indigenous Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 431, 432(2002) (noting dearth of legal scholarship about indigenous nation law and
[Vol. 83, 2004]
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"One major piece that is missing in the law review writing is a
narrative of success .... Scholars need to educate the federal
courts-as well as ourselves-that tribal self-government can
prosper in the twenty-first century in ways that are efficacious
and appropriate."16 Otherwise, the impression will continue in
the minds of some members of the Court and many members of
the public that tribal sovereignty is nothing more than an incon-
sistent, paradoxical legal shell that American case law has con-
structed. To fill in this problematic gap in understanding, this
Article examines how the Navajo Nation has both adapted to
and resisted federal decisions and, in the process, forged its own
unique responses to the question of the significance of tribal sov-
ereignty. Emerging from this localized study is a theory of
American Indian tribal sovereignty grounded in the law as well
as the life of tribes. 7 Such a theory should be more useful than
the oft-criticized legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty18 for assess-
ing whether to perpetuate or curtail the separate political exis-
tence of Indian nations.
Part I of this Article describes legal and political developments
in the Navajo Nation that relate to moments when the Supreme
Court has redefined legal sovereignty. What emerges is a picture
of a nation hard at work, enacting its sovereignty in creative
ways. The Navajo Nation's adaptation and resistance to federal
processes, and observing that the scholarship that has emerged tends to focus solely
on tribal courts).
16 Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commen-
tary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA
L. REV. 5, 12 n.37 (2002).
17 This Article is thus part of the emerging body of scholarship that heeds Frank
Pommersheim's call to provide a reservation-based view of federal Indian law. See
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CON-
TEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 8 (1995); see also Bethany Berger, Justice and the Out-
sider: Jurisdiction Over Non-Members in Tribal Legal Systems, UNIV. CONN.
SCHOOL OF LAW WORKING PAPERS 16 (2004) (examining Navajo Nation tribal court
decisions involving non-tribal members), available at http://lsr.nellco. org/cgi/view-
content.cgi?article=1015&context=uconn/ucwps (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
18 See, for example, Getches, supra note 11, and Frickey, supra note 13, for arti-
cles critiquing the legal doctrine. In particular, Getches's and Frickey's analyses ex-
pose the worrisome absence of theory guiding the Court's decisions about legal
doctrine. According to Getches, the Court's agenda in other areas of law fills its
otherwise empty Indian law vessel. Getches, supra note 11, at 329; see also Singer,
supra note 12, at 659-60 (observing the Court's inconsistent application of norms in
the state/federal context and the tribal Indian law context). Justice Thomas's con-
currence in United States v. Lara further highlights the problem of viewing tribal
sovereignty solely through the lens of the Court's own definitions of it. 541 U.S. 193,
213-26 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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law allows a distinctly Navajo political and cultural life to con-
tinue. Simultaneously, it is clear that the overlay of federal deci-
sional law has a profound and at times confining effect on the
Navajo Nation's ability to engage in meaningful self-governance.
In Part II, theories of American Indian tribal sovereignty are
reconsidered. The unsatisfactory nature of legal sovereignty has
led some scholars to suggest that sovereignty ought to be defined
from the inside, by looking at what tribes are doing to protect
what is essential about their cultures, rather than from the
outside, by looking solely to the cramped and contradictory legal
definitions of sovereignty that issue from the federal courts. The
term "cultural sovereignty" has emerged to capture the project of
theorizing about tribal sovereignty from the internal tribal per-
spective. Yet this study of the Navajo Nation indicates that part
of what some tribes are doing to further cultural sovereignty is
adapting to federal decisional law. The legal framework is ines-
capable and has constructed not just the avenues available to
tribes for perpetuating their cultures, but aspects of tribal iden-
tity itself; the ability of tribes to define sovereignty internally de-
pends on their adeptness at responding to legal rules issuing from
the "[c]ourts of the conqueror."19 This Article suggests that cul-
tural theories of sovereignty on the one hand and doctrinal defi-
nitions of sovereignty on the other are both enriched by
experiential accounts, like this one of the Navajo Nation, that
describe the relationship between the two. Without understand-
ing the significance of cultural sovereignty, reforming the legal
doctrine of sovereignty runs the risk of becoming a dry exercise
in formalism. And a theory of cultural sovereignty that does not
account for the role of federal Indian law erects an artificial bar-
rier between culture and law that risks obscuring the effects of
legal doctrine on tribal cultural survival.
Part III applies the lessons from the Navajo, and the experien-
tial theory of tribal sovereignty, to various suggestions concern-
ing the direction the federal law ought to take if protecting tribal
existence is one of its goals. Solutions to the problem of the Su-
preme Court's redefinition of legal sovereignty should account
for the diversity in the ways Indian tribes enact their sovereignty
on the ground. And any solution should have sufficient elasticity
to allow Indian tribes to adapt legal sovereignty to serve the pur-
pose of perpetuating their unique and irreplaceable cultures.
19 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823).
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I
THE NAVAJO NATION: A CASE STUDY IN
ENACTING SOVEREIGNTY
The Navajo Nation is one of the most studied tribes. Academ-
ics, journalists, and others are drawn to the Dind2 ° homeland,
located in the four corners area of the Southwest, for a variety of
compelling reasons. It is the Indian nation with the largest land
base; Navajo Indian country comprises twenty-seven thousand
square miles,2 ' or roughly seventeen million acres, which is
slightly larger than West Virginia and comparable in size to Ire-
land. It is also the second-most populous Indian nation, with
298,197 tribal members, 168,000 of whom reside in Navajo Indian
country.22 For legal scholars, the Navajo Nation's highly active
and developed tribal court system and substantial body of deci-
sional law, including Navajo customary law, constitute a signifi-
cant draw. For historians and anthropologists, the Navajo's
resilience and consequent ability to maintain an intact yet ever-
evolving culture provide ample fodder for study. And for all of
these reasons and more, the Navajo Nation is an interesting and
unique place to spend time. In addition, with respect to this
study in particular, access to research materials such as council
resolutions and minutes, interviews with key participants in the
Navajo legal system, and other intangibles making research pos-
sible were facilitated by my familiarity with the place and at least
some of its players.23
First, a brief word on methodology is called for. The primary
sources reviewed for this study included legal documents (com-
prising tribal council resolutions and minutes as well as tribal
case law), periodicals, tax department documents, and other ma-
20 Din6 is the word in the Navajo language that the Navajo use to refer to
themselves.
21 See Navajo Nation Washington Office, at http://www.nnwo.org/nnprofile.htm
(last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
22 U.S. Census Bureau, Summary File 4, at http://www.census.gov/ PressRelease/
www/2003/SF4.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
23 1 spent three years, from 1993-96, working for DNA-People's Legal Services in
Thba City, Navajo Nation. DNA is a non-profit organization that has provided free
legal services to low-income residents of the Navajo and Hopi Nations as well as
some surrounding areas since 1968. From 1996-1999, through my work as the direc-
tor of the Indian Law Clinic at the University of Colorado School of Law, I contin-
ued to represent Navajo families in cases involving equal access to education. In
addition, the Clinic assisted the Navajo Nation Supreme Court by providing law
clerks to research cases and draft bench memoranda.
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terial relevant to how the Navajo Nation has reacted to Supreme
Court decisions defining the contours of tribal sovereignty from
the period between 1970 and 2003. In addition, I interviewed
key participants in the Navajo legal and political systems. During
many of the interviews, it was clear that there is an aspect of
tribal sovereignty that is expressive for tribal members. They
feel deeply that sovereignty matters, and that any unilateral in-
cursions by the Supreme Court are an affront to justice, or even
survival, for Indian people. While it is hard to quantify these ex-
pressions of sovereignty, they are an integral part of my conclu-
sions concerning the centrality of tribal political sovereignty to
the continued existence of Indian tribes as separate cultures. The
study thus includes quantitative as well as qualitative elements in
its attempt to assess the impacts of federal law on some of the
core values that sovereignty, by almost any definition, is intended
to protect.24 Those values include providing peace and security,
developing economic opportunities, and allowing for the expres-
sion of social, cultural, and linguistic patterns.25 While this study
is no doubt incomplete in some respects, it provides thorough
information about legal responses to federal decisions, and
makes a concerted effort to explain, at least partially, how the
legal responses relate to Navajo life and culture. We know for
certain, for example, how much revenue the Navajo Nation re-
ceives from taxation. We also know, in only the uncertain way
that these things can ever be known, that Navajo identity is
bound up with the separate political existence of the Navajo
Nation.
24 There is a vast, argumentative literature regarding the appropriate justification
for national sovereignty. See, e.g., HINSLEY, supra note 4, at 16 (discussing moral
coercion as the basis for state sovereignty); id. at 126-57 (discussing consent-based
theories, including those of Hobbes and Locke); see also MARGARET CANOVAN,
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF HANNAH ARENDT 68, 70 (1974) (summarizing Ar-
endt's view that the notion of sovereignty is entirely incompatible with the ideal of
democratic politics). Regardless of conflicting theories of the legitimacy of sover-
eignty, however, it is possible to canvass agreement concerning what "sovereignty"
is intended to protect. See, e.g., HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY,
SELF-DETERMINATION 4, 95 (1990) (domestic functions of sovereignty encompass
the right to self-determination, which includes forging a political system, guiding
economic and social development, and protecting cultural and religious values).
25 See KIRKE KICKINGBIRD ET AL., INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 1-2 (1977). Tribal defi-
nitions of sovereignty quoted in this volume include the inherent right to select a
system of government; the power to govern in ways that meet the political, social,
and cultural needs of the people; and the right to exist without external exploitation
or interference. Id.; see also HANNUM, supra note 24, at 95.
[Vol. 83, 2004]
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Two brief overviews are necessary before getting into the de-
tails of the study conducted for this Article. First, because the
legal definition of tribal sovereignty is a necessary prerequisite
for understanding what tribal sovereignty is on the ground, an
introduction to the federal law of tribal sovereignty is required.
Second, some historical background regarding the emergence of
the modern Navajo Nation is necessary to understand the legal
and political nature of Navajo cultural identity.
A. Legal Sovereignty: Introduction to the Framework of
Federal Decisional Law
American Indian tribes have a unique legal status. They are
sovereign nations whose existence pre-dates the Constitution,26
and yet they have been folded into the United States and its do-
mestic legal framework through a series of court decisions and
other legislative and political acts. Indian tribes have also been
subject to fluctuating federal policies regarding their right to exist
as separate sovereigns, sometimes with effects that long outlive
the federal policies themselves. The two most serious examples
of such effects include the lingering consequences of the divesti-
ture of Indian lands27 and the inter-generational impacts of the
break-up of Indian families and other efforts to eradicate Indian
languages and cultures.28 Both of these policies were ascendant
during the allotment period at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury,29 and yet have cultural and legal repercussions on tribal
self-governance today. It is therefore difficult and artificial to
summarize the domestic legal status of tribes by looking solely to
26 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978); Worcester v. Geor-
gia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
27 See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIz. ST. L. J. 1
(1995).
28 See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nine-
teenth-Century Christianization Policy In Twentieth-Century Native American Free
Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REv. 773, 776-805 (1997) (recounting educational and
other policies that enlisted religious assistance to assimilate American Indians)
[hereinafter Dussias, Ghost Dance]; Allison M. Dussias, Waging War With Words:
Native Americans' Continuing Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages,
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 905-21 (1999) (describing policies aimed at eliminating Native
language and culture) [hereinafter Dussias, Waging War With Words].
29 See Royster, supra note 27, at 9 (summarizing philosophy and practices of the
allotment era). Royster aptly observes: "Despite the 'flat, miserable failure' of pre-
vious experiments in allotment, advocates of the policy believed that individual own-
ership of property would turn the Indians from a savage, primitive, tribal way of life
to a settled, agrarian, and civilized one." Id. (citations omitted).
1117
OREGON LAW REVIEW
the Supreme Court and its pronouncements. Yet because the Su-
preme Court has taken such an extraordinarily active role in de-
fining that status lately, it is nonetheless necessary to focus on the
Court's definitions of tribal self-governance.
Justice John Marshall made the first foray into defining the do-
mestic legal status of American Indian tribes. In a trilogy of
cases decided in the 1820s and 1830s, Justice Marshall held that
Indian tribes are subject to the greater power of the federal gov-
ernment with respect to the disposition of property,30 that Indian
tribes do not have the status of foreign nations,31 and that Indian
tribes nonetheless retain their pre-constitutional powers of self-
governance over their members and their territory, subject only
to the superior power of the federal government, and not to that
of states.32 The status of tribes as separate sovereigns was af-
firmed in two cases toward the end of the nineteenth century.
Both cases involved criminal matters. In Ex Parte Crow Dog, the
Court held that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal
acts committed by Indians against Indians within a tribe's reser-
vation boundaries.33 In Talton v. Mayes, the Court determined
that tribes were not required to provide Fifth Amendment grand
jury proceedings in criminal cases because tribal governmental
authority predates the Constitution and therefore is not subject
to restraints contained in the Bill of Rights.34 One final nine-
teenth century case sets the backdrop of decisional law with re-
spect to tribal self-governance. In United States v. McBratney,
the Court held that states have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians who commit crimes against non-Indians within the
boundaries of an Indian reservation .3  Based on these cases, at
the dawn of the twentieth century, federal Indian law embodied
the following principles: American Indian tribes are sovereign
governments subject to the greater power of the federal govern-
ment but not that of individual states; tribes thus lack the status
of foreign nations and are unable to engage in foreign diplomacy;
but tribes, as pre-constitutional sovereigns, have authority over
their internal affairs, subject to a very narrow exception for crim-
30 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 585 (1823).
31 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 38 (1831).
32 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
33 109 U.S. 556, 559 (1883).
34 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
35 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
[Vol. 83, 2004]
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inal matters between non-Indians.36
The Supreme Court decided a very significant federal Indian
law case at the beginning of the next century. In Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, the Court deferred to what it called the "plenary au-
thority"37 of Congress, and refused to subject to judicial scrutiny
a congressional act that unilaterally abrogated a tribe's treaty
rights.31 The Kiowa tribe's treaty included a provision that pro-
hibited further land cessions by the tribe unless consented to by a
supermajority of tribal members.39 Congress nonetheless en-
acted a statute mandating the allotment of the Kiowa reserva-
tion. The Lone Wolf decision has been heavily criticized both for
its dubious reasoning4" and its harsh consequences. 41 As to the
latter, after briefly summarizing the devastating effects of allot-
ment policies on tribes, Phil Frickey concludes that "allotment
vividly documents that Lone Wolf [sic] has two key facets. First,
it concerns the attribution of a dangerous, unchecked power to
Congress, authority that seems inconsistent with the rule of law.
Second, it involved the use of that power for misbegotten pur-
poses with disastrous consequences. ' 42 The former consequence,
the unchecked power to Congress, has not yet been redressed in
the law, and thus exacerbates the already troubled concept of tri-
bal sovereignty. Indian tribes, according to Justice Marshall, be-
came subordinate to the superior power of the federal
government by virtue of colonization.43 And less than a century
later in Lone Wolf, the Court found that the nature of this colo-
nized state is subject to the sole discretion of the legislative
branch.' What kind of sovereignty can it be that depends, for its
continued existence, on the pleasure of a branch of government
of another nation? This question has plagued scholars for some
3 6 See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW: NA-
TIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 24-25 (1987).
37 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
3 8 Id. at 564.
39 Id. at 568.
40 See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984) (providing critical historical
review of origins of plenary power doctrine).
41 See Frickey, supra note 16, at 6-7.
42 Id. at 7.
43 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
44 For a lengthy essay critiquing the constitutional underpinnings of the plenary
power doctrine, see generally Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002).
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time, and now has been raised by a member of the Supreme
Court.
45
Notwithstanding the potential fragility, as a legal matter, of tri-
bal sovereignty as the allotment period came to a close, the Su-
preme Court did not weigh in significantly on matters of tribal
self-governance for the next fifty years.46 During that time, allot-
ment policies were abandoned, and the executive and legislative
branches generally supported policies of tribal self-determina-
tion.47 Still, allotment resulted in complicated land patterns and,
in some cases, unclear reservation boundaries, leaving some
lower courts and scholars to question whether the framework of
tribal sovereignty continued to exist.48 As Charles Wilkinson has
noted, the lower court cases led one commentator, writing in
1959, to query whether Indian tribal sovereignty "has been pure
legal fiction for decades. ' 49
As it turned out, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
the continued vitality of tribal sovereignty that same year. In
Williams v. Lee, the Court clarified that tribal sovereignty was
not legal fiction, at least no more so than any other legal doc-
trine.50 Williams involved a lawsuit against Navajo tribal mem-
bers by a non-Indian trader. The trader filed a collection action
against the tribal members in Arizona state court. The Court
held that state courts lack jurisdiction over matters involving In-
dian defendants that arise within an Indian tribe's reservation
boundaries, even when the plaintiff is non-Indian.5 The Court
weighed in firmly on the side of a presumption in favor of tribal
self-governance against the intrusions of state law into Indian
45 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(questioning whether tribal sovereignty persists notwithstanding the contradictory
premises that lie at the core of the Court's doctrine). While most of the scholarly
criticism points in the direction of limiting federal plenary power as the solution to
this paradox, Justice Thomas suggests that another solution would be to eliminate
tribal inherent sovereignty. See id. at 218-19.
4 6 WILKINSON, supra note 36, at 23-31 (noting that the Supreme Court decided a
handful of cases at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centu-
ries, but most of the action up until 1959 was in lower federal courts or state courts).
47 The termination era was a brief, and to tribes, frightening exception to this
trend. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERI-
CAN JUSTICE, 15-20 (1983) (discussing the termination era policies from 1945-1961).48 See WILKINSON, supra note 36, at 26-27 (noting that both courts and scholars
voiced skepticism regarding independent powers of tribal self-governance).
49 Id. at 27 (citing Robert W. Oliver, The Legal Status of American Indian Tribes,
38 OR. L. REv. 193, 231 (1959)).
50 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
51 Id. at 223.
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country, concluding that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them."52
After Williams, there was a gap of a little over a decade before
the Court revisited Indian law again in a serious way. It has been
largely from the early 1970s on that the Court has refined the
contours of tribal sovereignty. On one end of the spectrum, the
Court has affirmed and strengthened the inherent sovereign au-
thority of tribes. These cases, which I will refer to as Category A,
include ones in which the Court recognizes inherent tribal pow-
ers to govern tribal members or non-members as well as those in
which the Court has held that states lack power to regulate the
activities of tribal members or non-members within Indian coun-
try. Williams, for example, fits both of these descriptions. It rec-
ognized the inherent powers of tribes to regulate the conduct of
those, including non-members, who engage in commercial trans-
actions within a tribe's reservation boundaries, and also held that
the state could not extend its laws into Indian country, even by
way of a state's judicial decisions, absent clear congressional
authorization.53
On the other end of the spectrum, the Court has limited tribal
governmental authority in two ways. In Category B cases, the
Court has allowed greater and more intrusive forms of state reg-
ulation within Indian country. In Category C cases, the Court
has limited tribal authority over non-members in Indian country.
Almost all of the Supreme Court decisions that might have some
direct effect on tribal governance fit within these three catego-
ries.54 In Part I.C., the cases within each category will be consid-
52 Id. at 220.
53 Id. at 223.
54 1 add the caveat "almost" because there certainly are some cases that do not
address tribal powers head-on that nonetheless have impacts on tribes and their abil-
ities to govern. For example, the Supreme Court recently decided two cases in
which tribes sued the federal government alleging violations of the federal trust obli-
gation. See United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003)
(finding in favor of the tribe in a matter involving federal trust obligation to main-
tain physical property); United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (holding
that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act does not impose trust obligation such that fed-
eral government is financially liable to tribe for behavior by government officials
that was alleged to have blatantly undermined tribal interests). While these cases
may have fairly substantial effects on tribal economic health, and in that sense im-
pact tribal self-governance, they are primarily about limitations, or their absence, on
federal governmental behavior rather than tribal governmental behavior. Thus
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ered in terms of how they have impacted the Navajo Nation.
B. Historical Background of the Navajo Nation
The history of the Navajo people is a story of constancy and
change. The most significant constant is that of place. Place is
central to Navajo culture and identity, and understanding the
modern Navajo Nation necessitates an understanding of the in-
terconnectedness between the Din6 and their land base.55 Histo-
rian Peter Iverson begins his informative history of the Navajo
with an overview of the Navajo origin story.56 He does so in or-
der to emphasize that the Navajo literally come into being, in
terms of defining themselves as a distinct people, through a rela-
tionship to their homeland. Another crucial place-based story
for the Navajo is the narrative of their forced march away from
their homeland, the "Long Walk," and their eventual triumphant
return in 1868 after surviving imprisonment in the Bosque
Redondo in New Mexico. 7
Recognizing the Navajo as a people who self-define through
attachment to place rather than solely through lineal descent is
one key to understanding the political nature of Navajo identity,
which has been forged by adaptation and change.58 The indis-
pensable constant in historical times has been connection to the
beautiful, sparse, dry, and wind-swept landscape between the
Navajo's four sacred mountains. With identity firmly rooted in
place, the Navajo have been otherwise free to incorporate other
people, their traditions, their economic practices, and still remain
Navajo.59 The political nature of Navajo identity reinforces the
significance of the tribe's sovereignty; without the status of a soV-
these cases, and others with similarly limited relevance to the particular issues of this
study, were not examined in terms of their impacts on tribal self-governance.
55 See PETER IVERSON, DrNr: A HISTORY OF THE NAVAJOS 5, 7-8 (2002).
56 Id. at 8-12.
57 See id. at 8, 51-53.
58 Iverson puts it this way:
The Navajos' vibrant culture has never stood still. Through time it has
demonstrated that it is through contact with others that a community truly
enjoys vitality. All along the way, the Din6 have incorporated new ele-
ments, new peoples, and new ways of doing things .... In time, whether it
be a so-called squash blossom necklace or a modern sport called basket-
ball, it will not matter where it came from. It becomes Navajo.
Id. at 6.
59 Id. "Through the centuries Navajos have brought in all sorts of other folks-
Puebloans, Apacheans, and others-and, in time, made them, or their children or
their children's children, into Din." Id.
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ereign, the Navajo Nation would not be able to protect the dis-
tinct evolving nature of Navajo culture. The constancy of place
leaves room for the changing nature of what is still distinctly
Navajo.
Regarding the Navajo origin story, oral histories describe a
transition from the first world to the third world that in some
respects tracks the story of evolution.60 The final transition is to
the fourth, or glittering, world, which is the site of present day
Navajo land. The land is identified by the four sacred mountains
at the perimeter: Blanca Peak in Colorado in the East, Mount
Taylor in New Mexico in the South, the San Francisco Peaks in
Arizona in the West, and Hesperus Peak in Colorado in the
North. The fourth world represents the period of increased con-
tact between Athabaskan people and people of Puebloan heri-
tage.61 From the outset, Navajo identity was forged through the
consensual melding of various cultures, for it is in the fourth
world that the Navajo emerge as a mature and distinct people.62
The Navajo origin story itself defines the Dind at a moment of
adaptation.
In this respect, the historical record affirms the Navajo origin
story. For many years, the historical orthodoxy was that the Nav-
ajo, Apache, and other tribes whose languages are Athabaskan
arrived in the Southwest in the late 1400s or early 1500s, and
then displaced the Puebloan peoples who had arrived earlier.63
Any Navajo adaptation of Pueblo artifacts or culture was seen
derisively as stealing from people who had been there before.
Many modern historians, however, have a more nuanced expla-
nation of the arrival of the Navajo and other Athabaskan peo-
ples. First, the date of arrival of the Navajo and Apache has
been called into question, with some suggesting that it could be
as early as the l100s or 1200s.6 4 Second, the melding of cultural
and economic practices was often voluntary, as groups of individ-
uals joined the Athabaskan-speaking people who became,
6 0 See id. at 8, 11; see also RAYMOND FRIDAY LOCKE, THE BOOK OF THE NAVAJO
55-136 (1976) (recounting the Navajo creation story). Animal complexity increases
with each transition to a new world, thus loosely tracking Darwinian evolution.
61 IVERSON, supra note 55, at 12; see also LOCKE, supra note 60, at 129-36 (noting
that the Navajo clans emerge from Zuni, Apache, Pueblo, and Ute peoples' joining
the Dind).
62 See IVERSON, supra note 55, at 14; LOCKE, supra note 60, at 56.
63 See IVERSON, supra note 55, at 13-15.
64 See id. at 16.
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through this process of mutual infusion, Navajo.65 The Navajo
were not a distinct, separate group who came from the north as a
blank cultural slate to steal from others.66 Rather, the people
who emerged as Navajo by the fifteenth century were a blend of
Athabaskan, Puebloan, and other peoples: "Those who joined or
became part of the Navajos brought ideas, knowledge, and mate-
rial items with them. The expansion of the Din6 cultural reper-
toire therefore came about through infusion of new people
rather than by borrowing or duplication."67 The story of the
fourth world includes this narrative of becoming Din6 through
blending with others.68
The mutual infusion model continued after the arrival of
Europeans. When the Spanish came to the Rio Grande Valley in
what is now New Mexico, they brought horses, goats, sheep, and
cattle, all of which have since become integral to the traditional
Navajo way of life. Sheep, in particular, have a talismanic place
in Navajo culture; sheep have been identified with motherhood
and, therefore, with the very core of perpetuating Navajo exis-
tence.69 There are sheep on the Navajo Nation flag. "Sheep is
Life," has become the phrase that embodies the centrality of
sheep to Navajo livelihood.7" As Bethany Berger notes, sheep
butchering is one of the categories that young Navajo women
must master to compete for the title of Miss Navajo Nation.7 In
the world of pan-Indian humor, jokes about Navajo and mutton
65 See id. at 13-21.
66 See id. at 14 (concluding that at a minimum there is "sufficient uncertainty...
that we have every right to be skeptical about orthodox archaeological accounts in
which Navajos arrive essentially intact as a linguistic community, but curiously
empty-handed otherwise").
67 Id. at 19.
68 See LOCKE, supra note 60, at 129-36.
69 See IVERSON, supra note 55, at 23 ("Sheep, goats, horses, and cattle were all
central to the evolution of Din6 society and economy, but from the beginning, the
sheep mattered most."); see also id. (quoting an attendee at the "Sheep is Life"
conference: "My mother taught us that the sheep is our mother. They will care for
you."). Betty Reid, a reporter for the Arizona Republic, put it this way, "It tickles
my non-Navajo friends in Phoenix to think I tend sheep some weekends. What they
don't know, and I can't describe for them, is how much the sheep are still part of me
and have been the focus of Navajo life for generations." Betty Reid, Returning to
the Flock: Family Sheep Camp Remains a Big Part of Writer's Navajo Tradition,
ARiz. REPUBLIC, May 9, 1999, at Al, available at http://www.azcentral. com/news/
reid/sheepherding.shtml.
70 IVERSON, supra note 55, at 23; see generally JOHN J. WOOD ET AL., "SHEEP IS
LIFE": AN ASSESSMENT OF LIVESTOCK REDUCTION IN THE FORMER NAVAJO-HoPI
JOINT USE AREA (1982).
71 Berger, supra note 17, at 99.
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abound.72 And Navajo comedian Vincent Craig has created the
cartoon "Mutton Man," which chronicles the life of a typical
Navajo kid and his family and friends, and includes tales of
boarding school life and other Navajo trials and tribulations.73
The integration of sheep into Navajo life is emblematic of the
modus operandi of Navajo adaptation and identity creation; a
European introduction has become central to Dind culture.
The Spanish-Mexican influence continued until the Mexican-
American War and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848,
which transferred the governance of most of the West from Spain
to the United States. The Spanish-Mexican period was not with-
out its violent clashes. The Navajo were perceived as a persis-
tent, recalcitrant problem by many within the colonial
leadership.74 But the mutual infusion of cultures occurred along-
side attempts at colonial rule. In addition to incorporating live-
stock, the Navajo adopted designs and techniques for weaving
and silver-smithing that would become as inherent to their mate-
rial culture as sheep. 75 In addition, Pueblo peoples fleeing Span-
ish persecution intermixed with and became Navajo, bringing
agricultural knowledge as well as religious and social practices.76
Thus, notwithstanding the many difficulties of the period from
the sixteenth through the mid-nineteenth century for the Nav-
ajo,7 7 it was also a time of continued growth and consolidation of
the Navajo identity. By 1848, the Navajo had become a "people
who mattered. 78
But being "a people who mattered" under U.S. colonial rule
was not necessarily a good thing. The Navajo's growing popula-
tion, dispersed leadership, and at times aggressive behavior to-
ward their Indian and non-Indian neighbors made them the bane
72 For example, the following appears on a Native American humor website:
"You might be a Navajo Jedi if ... You discover that Ewoks taste like mutton."
Native American Jokes and Humor, at http://home.att.net/-native-jokes/
page2l.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
73 The Navajo Times runs the Mutton Man comic strips, which I used to read
regularly when I lived in Tuba City.
74 See IVERSON, supra note 55, at 24-32.
75 Id. at 32, 24 (describing introduction of indigo dye, red fabric, and looms); id. at
33 (documenting access to broader markets for Navajo weaving).
7 6 See EDWARD H. SPICER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST: THE IMPACT OF SPAIN, MEX-
ICO, AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE INDIANS OF THE SOUTHWEST, 1533-1960, at
212 (1962).
7 7 See IVERSON, supra note 55, at 24-32 (noting that hardships included slavery
and violent suppressions).
7 8 Id. at 33.
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of the Arizona and New Mexico territorial governments. After
the Civil War settled the question of slavery and therefore
opened the West for expansion, the pressure to make the area
"safe" for railroads, miners, and homesteaders increased. From
1846 through 1860, the relationship between the Navajo, the mili-
tary, and the territorial governments was unsteady, fluctuating
between violence and attempts at treaties.79 By the early 1860s
historical forces converged to result in a policy of deliberate re-
moval of the Navajo from their homeland in order to "civilize"
them and settle the territory.80
From 1863-1866, the United States undertook a military cam-
paign aimed at destroying Navajo livelihood in order to force the
people off the land and remove them to an area known as the
Bosque Redondo at Fort Sumner in New Mexico. Led by Kit
Carson, the campaign was brutal and included actions such as
destroying orchards, burning cornfields, filling in water sources,
and exterminating Navajo who were too old or weak to endure
the forced march of several hundred miles.8' The process of for-
cibly removing Navajo people from their homeland took several
years and entailed at least fifty-three different episodes of herd-
ing tribal members to the Bosque.82 Not all Navajo were re-
moved. Several thousand Navajo, particularly in the remote and
rugged areas of Black Mesa and Navajo Mountain, managed to
evade the soldiers.83 Others chose to end their lives rather than
leave.84 Most, however, were rounded up and led on foot to the
sparse land along the Rio Grande that became, to them, a prison.
This period has become known to Navajo as the "Long Walk," in
much the same way that the lengthy campaign to remove the
Cherokee from their eastern homelands to the Indian Territory
became known as the "Trail of Tears."
The Long Walk and its aftermath of imprisonment at the
Bosque have become integral to Navajo identity. The experience
of hardship and suffering, and the emergence to return to the
Navajo homeland under the terms of the Treaty of 1868, are
foundational Din6 narratives. That the treaty secured at least a
79 Id. at 37-46
80 Id. at 48-51.
81 Id. at 51-57.
82 Id. at 52.
83 Id. at 57
84 Id. at 55.
85 See id. at 64-65.
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part of the Navajo's land base was a major triumph, given that
the Indian policy at the time heavily encouraged removal of all
Indians to the Indian Territory.86 And the Long Walk, imprison-
ment, and the treaty negotiations solidified the Navajo as a single
people. As Peter Iverson observes, the Navajo "had learned as
they went through so much with each other, that they had much
in common. The U.S. government had insisted on dealing with
them as one people, and this era had increased their own sense of
themselves in this way.",
87
For these reasons, the Treaty of 1868 bears a similar emotional
place in Navajo history to that of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence in the history of the United States. The treaty marks Nav-
ajo liberation from imprisonment, return to the Navajo
homeland, and embodies the promise of a perpetual separate ex-
istence.88 The significance of 1868, the year of the treaty, is ele-
gantly embodied in a poetry collection by Navajo writer Sherwin
Bitsui. The collection includes three poems of import here. The
first, entitled Asterisk, begins "Fourteen ninety-something, some-
thing happened. ' 89 The third, Atlas, includes the question "How
many Indians have stepped onto train tracks, hearing the hoof
beat of horses in the bend above the river rushing at them like a
cluster of veins scrawled into words on the unmade bed?" 90
Sandwiched between the two is a poem, the entire text of which
consists of the numbers "1868" on an otherwise blank page.91
The land set aside for the Navajo in the 1868 Treaty was, how-
ever, only a fraction of the territory the Navajo considered home.
Over time, through a series of executive orders, the Navajo reser-
vation was expanded until it reached its current size with the last
addition in 1934.92 Also over time, the Navajo Nation's political
system evolved to reach its current unique balance between An-
glo-American tri-partite government and traditional Navajo
structures and laws.9
3
The period from 1868 to 1930 entailed restructuring Navajo
86 See id.
87 Id. at 64.
88 See id. at 3.89 See Sherwin Bitsui, SHAPESHIFr 3 (2003).
90 Id. at 6-7.
91 Id. at 5.
92 PETER IVERSON, TiH NAVAJO NATION 14-15 (Univ. of N.M. Press 1983)
(1981); see also IVERSON, supra note 55, at 72.
93 See Tom Tso, 1992 Navajo Nation Code of Judicial Conduct: Moral Principles,
Traditions, and Fairness in the Navajo, 76 JUDICATURE 15, 16 (1992) (summarizing
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government and the nation's being reintroduced to the U.S.
economy.9" Significant events in terms of the system of law and
order included the installation of courts overseen by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs in 1892. 95 Initially known as "C.F.R." courts,
and then as the Court of Indian Offenses, these tribunals were
intended to serve an assimilative role, enforcing matters such as
the prohibition on tribal customs.96 The first Navajo-wide gov-
erning body was also introduced during this period. In 1923, in
order to facilitate oil and gas extraction from the reservation, the
Department of the Interior initiated the creation of the Navajo
Tribal Council.97 While initiated by the Department, and fairly
limited in terms of its governmental powers, the Council none-
theless created an important forum for influential Navajo leaders
to meet and consider the collective future of their people.98 In-
deed, in the face of the next serious challenge to Navajo dignity
and survival, the Navajo increased their control over the Tribal
Council. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the poor condition of
the range and the desire of non-Indians to have greater access to
Navajo lands resulted in the Navajo stock reduction program. 99
The federal policies of forcibly removing and slaughtering Nav-
history of Navajo Nation judicial system and gradual evolution reincorporating Nav-
ajo customary law).
94 See IVERSON, supra note 55, at 97-136; see also Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dis-
pute Resolution and Promissory Obligations: Continuity and Change in the Largest
Native American Nation, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 23 (1993).
95 See Tso, supra note 93, at 16; Honorable Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It":
Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175, 177 (1994).
96 See Tso, supra note 93, at 16. The Courts of Indian Offenses "were administra-
tive bodies of the U.S. government designed to destroy Indian cultural practices and
educate Indians in the methods of American justice." Nonetheless, the Navajojudges appointed to these positions were often able to incorporate Navajo principles
of decision making. Id.
97 IVERSON, supra note 55, at 134.
98 See id. at 134-35. Iverson notes that:
It is certainly fair to conclude that the Council was created not to protect or
to assert Navajo sovereignty, but to provide a stamp to approve leases and
other forms of exploitation. Nevertheless, the creation of the Council is a
significant landmark-not so much for what the Council did as for what it
would become.
Id. at 134. Iverson also adds that:
Din6 delegates began to demonstrate an interest in central questions that
faced the people. They began, in many instances, to take a broader view of
particular concerns. They began to see how the Council eventually might
become a vehicle to express their views and to work for the benefit of all
Dind.
Id. at 135.
99 See id. at 187; WOOD ET AL., supra note 70.
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ajo livestock enraged Navajo people. TO many Navajo, it rivaled
the Long Walk and imprisonment at the Bosque in terms of its
inhumanity. °° In response to the federally imposed livestock de-
struction, the Navajo people insisted on greater control of their
government.l10
Emerging from the period of livestock reduction and moving
into the 1950s, the Navajo faced another threat to their way of
life. From the late 1940s until the mid 1950s, Congress enacted
measures intended to terminate the federal relationship with In-
dian tribes.102 In order to fend off efforts at federal termination,
which included assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction by
the states, the Navajo assumed greater control over their systems
of law and order, and modeled them closely after Anglo sys-
tems. °3 As Stephen Conn notes in his illuminating study of this
period, the Anglicization was quite deliberate. 1 4 In order to
preserve control over the system, the Navajo Nation shrewdly ca-
pitulated on its form: "The Navajos were concerned with the es-
tablishment of a legal forum which would be accepted by those
who would challenge the tribe's ability to govern."'01 5 The case of
Williams v. Lee played a role as well.' 6 Knowing that the Su-
preme Court would need assurance that debt collection actions
could be brought in tribal court, Navajo tribal lawyers pushed
reform measures before the tribal council.'07 In 1958, the Navajo
Tribal Council created a Navajo judicial branch, and in 1959
abolished the Navajo Courts of Indian Offenses in order to es-
tablish that Navajo tribal courts from then on would be instru-
mentalities of the Navajo tribal government, and not of the
Department of the Interior.0 8 The Court's decision in Williams
affirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal courts to hear
matters by non-Indian plaintiffs against tribal member defend-
100 See IVERSON, supra note 55, at 153 ; see also WOOD ET AL., supra note 70, at
11.
101 See Lieder, supra note 94, at 29 & n.131.
102 DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 47, at 10-20 (discussing termination policies of
1945-1961).
103 See Stephen Conn, Mid-Passage-The Navajo Tribe and Its First Legal Revolu-
tion, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329, 332 (1978).
104 Id. at 338-39.
105 Id.
106 358 U.S. 217 (1959); see Conn, supra note 103, at 358; see also supra notes 50-
53 and accompanying text (for discussion of Williams).
107 See Conn, supra note 103, at 358-59.
108 Id. at 359, 362.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
ants, thus ensuring that these defensive maneuvers by the Navajo
Nation were not futile. The Navajo Nation's defensive exercise
in constructing its own legal system proved to be a savvy act of
creative sovereignty, one that likely played a significant role in
achieving the Supreme Court precedent, Williams, that would
ensure the future of that same legal system.109
By the late 1960s, the period of termination had been put to
rest. In 1970, President Nixon formally repudiated the legal pol-
icy of termination and initiated programs to shift responsibility
for Indian programs from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to
tribes.110 The Indian Self Determination and Education Assis-
tance Act, passed in 1975, authorized tribes to assume control
over a variety of federally funded programs.11' Due to the
events of the late 1950s, the Navajo Nation was poised to take
advantage of this new phase in federal policy. After establishing
the court system, the Navajo Nation undertook a series of mea-
sures designed to reinforce the procedural and substantive fair-
ness of the courts. In the 1960s, legal training was required for
tribal members acting as advocates in tribal court."' In 1967 the
Navajo Nation Tribal Council passed a Bill of Rights, guarantee-
ing due process, equal protection, and other individual rights and
liberties." 3 In 1969, the Navajo Nation courts began publishing
their written decisions, making the law accessible to all litigants
appearing therein." 4 The Navajo Nation, more so than many
other Indian nations, had the basic governmental structures in
place to take advantage of the new federal support of tribal
sovereignty.
C. Strands of Sovereignty in the Modern Era
The foregoing basic introduction to the framework of federal
Indian law and relevant background regarding the Navajo Nation
sets the scene for this Article's analysis of how the Navajo Nation
has enacted its sovereignty in the shadow of Supreme Court doc-
109 See id. at 358.
110 H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, at 4-7 (1970) (enhancing tribal self-sufficiency through a
more limited role for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and other federal
agencies).
111 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458 (2000).
112 See Lieder, supra note 94, at 42.
113 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CO-63-67 (Oct. 9, 1967) (codified at NA-
nON CODE tit. 1, §§ 1-8 (Equity 1977)).
114 See Lieder, supra note 94, at 5 n.13.
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trine. The following sections analyze how the Navajo Nation's
exercise of various attributes of sovereignty has been affected by
Supreme Court decisions in the modern era. For reasons that
track the substantive areas of the Supreme Court's cases as well
as the different departments and functions of Navajo govern-
ment, general civil regulatory and adjudicative authority, taxa-
tion, and criminal authority are considered separately. Because
the Supreme Court's cases regarding tribal powers occasionally
impact more than one substantive area, however, there is some
cross-referencing and overlap with regard to the discussion of the
Court's doctrine. To the extent that it is both possible and help-
ful, the cases that affirm tribal sovereignty either by recognizing
tribal inherent powers or limiting state jurisdiction in Indian
country (Category A cases), the cases that allow concurrent state
jurisdiction in Indian country (Category B cases), and the cases
that divest tribes of categories of jurisdiction over non-tribal
members (Category C cases) are analyzed in turn for their effects
on the particular functional aspect of tribal self-governance.
1. General Civil Regulatory and Adjudicative Power
a. Acting on the Power to Regulate and Adjudicate
The Supreme Court has affirmed the general notion that In-
dian tribes retain inherent authority to govern, through civil reg-
ulation or adjudication, the activities of tribal members and non-
Indians within the boundaries of tribal territory. The exceptions
to this general notion, which in the context of non-Indians have
become significant, are addressed in Parts I.C.l.c. and I.C.2.c.,
below. As discussed above, Williams v. Lee affirmed the vitality
of tribal sovereignty in a case deciding whether a state court
could assert jurisdiction over a debt collection case between a
non-Indian plaintiff and Navajo defendants. 115 The Court held
that Congress had not authorized any such intrusion of state law
into Navajo territory, and that in the absence of such authoriza-
tion, state laws that "infringed" on tribal self-governance would
not apply." 6 The Court thus ousted state court jurisdiction, and
simultaneously affirmed that the Navajo Nation itself was the ex-
clusive forum in which the non-Navajo debt collector could seek
relief. 17
115 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
116 Id. at 222-23.
117 Id. at 223.
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Williams is a high-water mark for the principle of exclusive tri-
bal jurisdiction. Williams ousted state court jurisdiction com-
pletely, even in a case involving a non-tribal member.
Furthermore, Williams did not express any qualms about the al-
ternative forum-that of the tribal court-as a just and fair one
for resolving the underlying dispute. 118 To the contrary, the Nav-
ajo Nation's judicial system provided justification for the Court's
decision." 9 Finally, Williams appeared to adhere to the territo-
rial vision of tribal jurisdiction embraced by Marshall in Worces-
ter.12° The language in Williams left enough room, however, for
subsequent blurring of these relatively clear boundaries, as dis-
cussed in Parts I.C.l.c. and I.C.2.b.-c., below.
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez ,1 in a very different factual
and legal context, the Court again recognized the unique sover-
eign status, and attendant governmental powers, of tribes. In
Santa Clara, a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo filed a
lawsuit in federal court alleging that the Pueblo's membership
rules violated the equal protection provisions of the Indian Civil
Rights Act ("ICRA"). l2 The Court determined that Martinez's
case turned on whether the ICRA provided a private right of
action, beyond its express mention of habeas corpus relief, to en-
force its terms. 123 Before applying the conventional, non-Indian
law doctrine of implied rights of action, the Court emphasized
the unique context of this case:
[W]e must bear in mind that providing a federal forum for is-
sues arising under [the ICRA] constitutes an interference with
tribal autonomy and self-government beyond that created by
the change in substantive law itself .... Although Congress
clearly has power to authorize civil actions against tribal of-
ficers, and has done so with respect to habeas corpus relief...
a proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the
118 Id. at 222.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 219; see Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). In Worcester, the
Court stated:
The Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community occupying its own terri-
tory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter,
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of congress.
Id.
121 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
122 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2000).
123 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59.
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plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we
tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative
intent.124
Against this "backdrop" '125 of tribal sovereignty (and congres-
sional plenary power), the Court held that the statute did not
contain an implied right of action. The ICRA included two over-
arching goals: the promotion of tribal self-governance and the
protection of individual rights. The former goal would be under-
mined, the Court determined, if the statute were read to allow
federal suits against tribes to further the latter goal. 126 In coming
to this conclusion, the Court took particular note of the frail fi-
nancial health of many tribes, as well as the likelihood that tribal
forums would be disrespected if tribal actions could be readily
challenged in federal court. 27 Some commentators have criti-
cized Santa Clara, claiming that it lacks nuance in embracing a
patriarchal, and arguably relatively recent, manifestation of tribal
sovereignty at the expense of the political rights of a tribal mem-
ber.128 Others have claimed, on a more practical level, that the
Santa Clara Court did tribes a disservice in the long run by find-
ing no private right of action in the ICRA, because the non-re-
viewability of tribal decisions has led to the piecemeal divestment
of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 129 But as the Santa Clara
Court itself recognized, the heavy hand of the federal courts had
the potential to play a dominating and disruptive role in the nas-
cent development of modern tribal governments.1 30 While the
124 Id. at 59-60.
125 Id. at 60 (quoting McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172
(1973)).
126 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 64-65.
127 Id.
128 See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671,727 (1989). For critiques of this position, see Angela
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990), and Bethany R. Berger, Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman, 14
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2004).
129 See generally Robert Laurence, Martinez, Oliphant and Federal Court Review
of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL L. REv. 411
(1988); Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42
Aiuz. L. REV. 861 (2000); see also Gould, supra note 12, at 681-85 (criticizing Santa
Clara and positing that absent incorporation of the Bill of Rights into tribal law,
tribal courts will be unlikely ever to obtain jurisdiction over non-Indians outside of
very narrow circumstances).
130 See generally Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14 KAN. J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 97 (2004). In this essay, Swentzell, a Santa Clara Pueblo tribal mem-
ber, powerfully describes her sentiments in support of the Santa Clara decision.
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day had long passed when tribes could evolve beyond the influ-
ence of the federal government, the Court's heightened sensitiv-
ity to its institutional role, given the potential for federal courts
to overwhelm tribal self-direction, was appropriate as well as
consistent with a moderate view of Congress's plenary power
over Indian affairs.131
Two decisions from the 1980s, National Farmer's Insurance Co.
v. Crow Tribe'32 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. La Plante,133
showed similar institutional sensitivity. In National Farmer's, the
Court developed what has become known as the tribal court ex-
haustion doctrine, a prudential rule requiring non-Indian litigants
to exhaust their remedies through the tribal court process before
challenging tribal jurisdiction in federal court.' Iowa Mutual
affirmed the exhaustion rule, even in a case involving a non-In-
dian defendant who was a citizen of a different state than the
Indian plaintiffs.' 35 Neither National Farmer's nor Iowa Mutual
addressed the tribal jurisdiction question itself, leaving open the
possibility that the Supreme Court would later take away what it
appeared to endorse. Indeed, as will be discussed in Parts
I.C.l.c. and I.C.2.c., that possibility has become reality to a fairly
significant extent. 36 But the exhaustion doctrine nonetheless
put a damper on non-Indian defendants' tendency to flee tribal
courts, and as discussed below, resulted in a strong presumption
by many litigants of tribal court jurisdiction over a variety of
matters. 37
Swentzell describes the ways in which she and her daughters and granddaughters
have been pained by the Santa Clara constitutional provision, but that all of her
female family members nonetheless agree that they are better off as Indian women
addressing the issues within the tribe than risking destroying the tribe through fed-
eral judicial surveillance. Id. at 99-100.
131 The Court's approach in Santa Clara is thus sensitive to institutional roles in
two directions. First, it is mindful of the potentially stifling role that federal court
review could play in the context of the development of tribal governments. Second,
it is careful, given Congress's power in Indian affairs, to require any divestments of
tribal autonomy to be stated clearly. With respect to the second "clear statement"
requirement, the Court is arguably implementing an appropriate judicial tempering
of the plenary power doctrine.
132 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
133 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
134 471 U.S. at 856-57.
135 480 U.S. at 16.136 See infra notes 216-31 and accompanying text (discussing Montana and
Strate).
137 See infra notes 216-31 and accompanying text (discussing pre-Strate assump-
tions by non-Indians of the extent of tribal jurisdiction).
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A final civil case recognizing inherent tribal powers to regulate
non-Indians is both complicated and arguably obsolete. In
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, the Court, in a fractured opinion, upheld the tribe's au-
thority to impose its zoning requirements on non-Indians living
within a portion of the tribe's reservation deemed by the Court
to have retained its "tribal character."' 38 The "tribal character"
test has not survived much beyond Brendale, and the Court has
opted for other ways to cabin the reach of inherent tribal powers
over non-Indians.1
39
Complementing the "inherent tribal powers" cases are the
cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized restrictions on
the reach of state power. Worcester v. Georgia is the initial pre-
cedent for the concept of state jurisdiction stopping at reserva-
tion boundaries, 4 ° and Williams v. Lee is the leading modem
case limiting state authority in Indian country.' 4 ' In Williams,
the Supreme Court held that state courthouse doors are closed to
non-Indians suing tribal members for causes of action arising in
tribal territory.142 Since Williams, the Court has developed two
vocabularies for determining whether states can exercise govern-
mental powers in Indian country. The first is to inquire whether
state authority has been "preempted" by federal recognition of
exclusive tribal powers. The other looks to whether the state's
attempt to regulate "infringes" on tribal inherent powers. Both
of these vocabularies became prominent as a result of another
Navajo-based case, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
143Commission.
138 492 U.S. 408, 441 (1989).
139 See infra notes 275-80 and accompanying text (discussing Montana, Strate, and
Atkinson).
140 See 31 U.S. 515 (1832); see also supra notes 5, 43 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Worcester).
141 358 U.S. 217 (1959); see also supra discussion of Williams at notes 50-53 and
accompanying text.
142 358 U.S. at 223; see also supra discussion of Williams at notes 50-53 and ac-
companying text.
143 411 U.S. 164 (1973). Although McClanahan involves the ouster of state juris-
diction to tax, I discuss it here in the prelude to general civil authority, rather than
tax authority. Its approach is one of broad institutional sensitivity to the back-
ground presumption that Indian tribes are to be left alone, free from overlapping
state laws, unless Congress clearly says otherwise. In other words, I think McClana-
han is more important for its stance toward perpetuating what Charles Wilkinson
has called tribes' "measured separatism," than it is for anything directly related to
the Navajo Nation tax program. See WILKINSON, supra note 36, at 4-5, 14-19. There
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In McClanahan, Rosalind McClanahan, a Navajo tribal mem-
ber, filed a refund claim in Arizona state court arguing that the
state lacked authority to tax her income, which was earned at a
bank located within the boundaries of the Navajo reservation.
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, acknowledged
that the Indian sovereignty doctrine had not "remained static
during the 141 years since Worcester was decided," and therefore
the assertion of tribal sovereignty by Rosalind McClanahan did
not, in and of itself, defeat the state's taxing power. 1 44 But Jus-
tice Marshall also found that tribal sovereignty, though modified,
was still alive and well, and served as a "backdrop" against which
to interpret the relevant treaties and federal statutes to deter-
mine if the overall federal-tribal scheme left any room for state
taxation.145 The Court then reviewed the 1868 Treaty and vari-
ous federal statutory enactments that consistently affirmed the
assumption that states lacked jurisdiction over Navajos living on
the reservation. Conceding that no federal statutes explicitly ex-
empted on-reservation Indians from state income tax, 46 the
Court nonetheless inferred preemption from various general ac-
knowledgments of the independence of the Navajo Nation, as
well as Arizona's recognition of the tax-exempt status of Indian
lands. 1 47 The preemption analysis emerging from McClanahan is
therefore one that is generous toward tribes. General statements
about tribal independence from state control can lead to the con-
clusion of a specific prohibition on state authority. 148
is, to date, no Navajo Nation income tax, and it seems unlikely, given poverty levels
on the Navajo Nation, that there will be one any time soon.
144 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171.
145 Id. at 172.
146 See id. at 176-77.
147 Id. For more on Indian law preemption analysis, see generally DAVID H.
GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 432-37 (4th ed.
1998); FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982); WILKINSON, supra note 36, at ch. 4.
148 After McClanahan, the Court extended the prohibition on state taxation of
tribal member property, even in the context of a statute that explicitly permitted
other forms of civil regulatory powers in Indian country. See Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373, 377 (1976) (finding that Public Law 280, which extended state
civil jurisdiction over reservations, did not explicitly extend state taxing authority,
and thus state tax of a reservation mobile home was invalid). In the context of
taxation of tribal members residing within Indian country, the states' lack of author-
ity has since hardened into a categorical rule. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw
Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995) (holding that a state cannot apply motor fuel tax to
fuels sold by tribe in Indian country). Rather than undergo the specific preemption
analysis for each tribe, the Supreme Court assumes exemption from state taxation if
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The Supreme Court has also ousted state court jurisdiction de-
finitively in a case involving a family law matter. In Fisher v.
District Court, the Court held that a state court had no power to
hear a child custody proceeding involving tribal members who
resided within Indian country.
149
The cases recognizing inherent tribal powers to regulate and
adjudicate and restricting the reach of state authority in Indian
country appear to endorse a vision of tribal evolution to govern a
range of civil matters, including matters involving non-Indians.
The cases, when considered together, also appear particularly so-
licitous of tribal courts and the extent to which federal intermed-
dling could undermine tribal judicial authority. Subsequent cases
are not so solicitous, and have placed significant limitations on
tribal authority over non-members. 5 ° But the vision and institu-
tional sensitivity of the Category A cases nonetheless resulted in
significant opportunities for tribes to develop their regulatory
and judicial systems.
The Navajo Nation has taken advantage of these Supreme
Court decisions in a range of ways, and today has a robust gov-
ernment that has taken on many of the same functions as state
governments. 15 ' First, the Navajo have developed, and re-tribal-
ized, one of the most respected and busy' American Indian tri-
bal court systems in the country. The development of the Navajo
Nation judicial system has been studied by many legal schol-
ars.'53 In addition, Navajo Nation Supreme Court justices have
been prolific themselves, and have shared many insights concern-
the legal incidence of the tax falls on tribal members within Indian country. Id. at
459.
149 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976). In another child custody case, the Court again af-
firmed exclusive tribal court jurisdiction. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52-53 (1989). In Holyfield, however, the Court was con-
struing a federal statute, the Indian Child Welfare Act, rather than making federal
Indian common law. Id.
150 See discussion infra Parts I.C.l.c, 2.c, 3.b.
151 See infra app. A.
152 The Navajo Nation Judicial Branch reports a total number of court cases in
excess of 88,000 for each year from 2001-2003. See infra app. B.
153 See, e.g., Conn, supra note 103; Lieder, supra note 94; Daniel L. Lowery, De-
veloping a Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence: The Navajo Experience 1969-1992, 18
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 379 (1993); Marianne 0. Nielsen, Navajo Nation Courts, Peace-
making and Restorative Justice Issues, 44 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 105 (1999); Jayne
Wallingford, The Role of Tradition in the Navajo Judiciary: Reemergence and Revi-
val, 19 OKLA. Crr U. L. REV. 141 (1994); James W. Zion, Civil Rights in Navajo
Common Law, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 523 (2002); James W. Zion, Navajo Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 18 ToURo L. REV. 563 (2002).
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ing the history and development of Navajo law. 5 4 That work
will therefore not be repeated here, but it is important to note
that the common refrain is the unique melding of Anglo-Ameri-
can-style judicial systems and traditional Navajo customary
law. 55 In the context of its court system, the Navajo Nation
story of mutual infusion persists. On one hand, principles from
federal law, such as the interpretation of due process in the con-
text of personal jurisdiction, have been adopted by the tribal
courts. 56 On the other, the Navajo Nation has incorporated
Navajo customary law and traditional dispute resolution into its
legal system so successfully that the concepts have been studied
for application elsewhere. 57 The Navajo Nation has enacted in-
herent sovereignty in the judicial realm by developing a judicial
system that successfully straddles two worlds, providing a fair
and familiar forum for non-Navajo persons 158 and a culturally co-
herent body of laws and procedures for tribal members.
Less has been written about substantive Navajo law, and in
particular Navajo legislation. The Navajo Nation has enacted
laws that protect individual rights and liberties, some of which
exceed the protections in the U.S. Constitution. In 1967, the
Navajo Nation enacted a Bill of Rights, including due process
and equal protection provisions. 159 In 1980, the Navajo Nation
took a step that the United States has yet to take: the Navajo
Tribal Council voted by an overwhelming majority to adopt an
Equal Rights Provision, explicitly providing for legal equality be-
tween the sexes. 160
154 See generally Raymond D. Austin, ADR and the Navajo Peacemaker Court,
32:2 JUDGES J. 8 (1993); Tom Tso, Indian Nations and the Human Right to an Inde-
pendent Judiciary, 3 N.Y. CrrY L. REV. 105 (1998); Tso, supra note 93; Robert Yaz-
zie, "Hozho Nahasdlii" - We Are Now in Good Relations: Navajo Restorative
Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117 (1996); Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It":
Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175 (1994); Robert Yazzie, Navajo
Peacekeeping: Technology and Traditional Indian Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 95
(1997).
155 See Lowery, supra note 153; Tso, supra note 93; Wallingford, supra note 153.
156 See, e.g., Thompson v. Wayne Lovelady's Frontier Ford, 1 NAVAJO RPM. 282
(Navajo 1978) (applying "minimum contacts" analysis from federal cases to deter-
mine whether the Navajo Nation has personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants).
157 See generally Austin, supra note 154; Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for
Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1999);
Nielsen, supra note 153.
158 See generally Berger, supra note 17 (concluding that tribal courts treat non-
members fairly).
159 NATION CODE tit. 1, §§ 101-09 (Equity 1995).
160 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CF-9-80 (1980) (on file with author); see
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The Williams line of cases and the era of self-determination
also gave the Navajo Nation the breathing room to develop con-
sumer protection, employment, and other statutory laws that re-
late to core aspects of practical sovereignty, such as provision of
jobs and protection from unfair economic practices. As a precur-
sor to these substantive laws, in 1980 the tribal council approved
legislation expanding the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation tribal
courts.' 61 The Council Resolution notes that while the U.S. Su-
preme Court limited criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, no
such limitations had been placed on tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians "within Navajo Indian country."' 62 The resolution
also makes reference to the need for expanded access to the Nav-
ajo legal system: "Many non-Indians reside or do business or
conduct other activities within the Navajo Nation (Navajo Indian
country) and it is appropriate that these persons be called upon
to account for their activities and the effect thereof in the Courts
of the Navajo Nation."' 63 The resolution then amended the Nav-
ajo jurisdictional statute to "include civil actions in which the de-
fendant is a resident of Navajo Indian country, or has caused an
action to occur in Navajo Indian country."'"
With this expanded jurisdiction, the Navajo Nation was able to
pass laws regulating the behavior of tribal members as well as
non-members. One of the earliest, and most significant, con-
sumer protection laws was the Navajo Nation Repossession
Law.165 The statute requires consent to repossession of a vehicle
on tribal lands, or resort to the Navajo Nation courts to obtain an
order. This law has proved to be an important tool for warding
also Amending the Navajo Bill of Rights by Adding an Equal Rights Provision, Nav-
ajo Tribal Council (Feb. 7, 1980) (on file with author). Traditional Navajo society
was and is matrilineal in many respects, and yet tribal membership was then and is
now determined by blood quantum, irrespective of the sex of the tribal member
parent. Therefore, women's rights as well as formal legal equality between the sexes
were unproblematic concepts to the Navajo Tribal Council. Commentators con-
cerned about the sexist implications of Santa Clara should take note of this particu-
lar exercise of tribal sovereignty. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
161 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CF-19-80 (1980) (on file with author).
162 Id.
163 Id. Presumably, the reference to "Navajo Indian country" is meant to ac-
knowledge the fact that there might be jurisdictional limits over non-Indians on fee
land, but that these limits were presumed not to apply on tribal lands. Note that
Montana was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court when this Resolution was
passed. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text (discussing Montana).
16 4 Res. of Navajo Tribal Council, CF-19-80 (1980).
165 NATION CODE tit. 7, § 607 (Equity 1995).
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off unscrupulous business practices by car dealers, most of whom
are located off the Navajo reservation. Legal services lawyers
employed by DNA-People's Legal Services, the organization that
provides free legal assistance to low income residents of the Nav-
ajo and Hopi reservations, report that unethical and often illegal
practices by off-reservation businesses constitute a significant
percentage of the cases they handle.166
Protecting tribal members from questionable consumer prac-
tices in reservation border towns has proved to be a continuing
challenge. The relative dearth of commercial ventures on the
reservation leads many tribal members to shop for cars, mobile
homes, appliances, and other durable goods in the towns border-
ing the Navajo Nation, such as Flagstaff and Page in Arizona and
Gallup and Farmington in New Mexico. In 1999, the Navajo Na-
tion Tribal Council passed various consumer protection provi-
sions in order to curb problematic commercial behavior,
including inordinately high interest rates, unscrupulous pawn
shop policies, and "a host of unscrupulous, dishonest and preda-
tory business practices." '167 The legislation includes remedies for
unfair and deceptive trade practices, a ban on chain referral sales
techniques, penalties for misrepresentation of motor vehicles,
and a host of other pro-consumer provisions. 168
Providing employment for tribal members is another recurring
challenge for the Navajo Nation. The unemployment rate on the
Navajo Nation is very high, ranging from thirty-six percent to
over fifty percent.169 The "brain drain" of talented tribal mem-
bers who leave the Navajo Nation to find meaningful employ-
166 Interview with Anna Marie Johnson, Acting Director, DNA-People's Legal
Services, in Window Rock, Ariz. (July 8, 2003) (on file with author); Interview with
Levon Henry, Executive Director, DNA-People's Legal Services, in Window Rock,
Ariz. (Dec. 10, 2003) (on file with author); see also Interview with T.J. Holgate,
Navajo Nation District Court Judge, and Allen Sloan, Navajo Nation District Court
Judge, in Window Rock, Ariz. (July 9, 2003) (noting that lack of representation in
consumer cases is one of the biggest problems in the district court; non-Indian busi-
nesses know that they can get away with questionable behavior) (on file with au-
thor); DNA-PEOPLE'S LEGAL SERVICES, LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION
ANNUAL REPORTS, Cases Statistics, 1999-2002 (showing that consumer cases consti-
tute the second highest percentage of total case load; family law cases were number
one) (on file with author; reports located at DNA-People's Legal Services Office, in
Window Rock, Ariz.).
167 Res. of the Navajo Nation Council, CJY-71-99 (1999).
168 See id. at Exhibit One.
169 Ted Rushton, The Navajo Nation-An Overview, Utah Department of Com-
munity and Economic Development, at http://dced.utah.gov/indian-affairs/
utahtribestoday/dine.html (last visited March 16, 2005).
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ment threatens the continued vitality of the Navajo
community. 170 Even many tribal members who continue to con-
sider the Navajo Nation to be their primary residence are forced
to leave for periods of time to earn enough income to support
their families.171 Like migrant workers, these Navajo lead tran-
sient lives that challenge their ability to raise their children and
maintain contact with their families and culture. As in the con-
sumer context, inherent tribal authority to subject members and
non-members to tribal laws has been integral to Navajo attempts
to address employment issues. To respond to the need for Nav-
ajo employment protections, the Navajo Nation Tribal Council
passed the Navajo Preference in Employment Act. 172 The Act
established the Navajo Nation Labor Commission, an adminis-
trative body that enforces the Act through the promulgation of
regulations and adjudicative hearings. 73 The Act provides sub-
stantive and procedural protections for tribal member employ-
ees. It also extends some of its protections to non-tribal
members employed on the reservation.174 The attempt to pro-
vide economic security by encouraging employment on the reser-
vation serves one of the core functions associated with
sovereignty.175
The Navajo Nation has also exercised its governmental powers
to attempt to provide educational opportunities that simultane-
ously prepare Navajo children to compete in a non-Indian world
and reinforce Navajo language and culture. The history of edu-
cation in Indian country is profoundly troubled by the pervasive
influence of anti-Indian sentiment. During the allotment period
and for a long time afterwards, education was primarily a tool to
170 See Interview with Claudeen Bates Arthur, Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court, and Lorene Ferguson, Associate Justice of the Navajo Nation Su-
preme Court, in Window Rock Ariz. (Dec. 9, 2003) (on file with author).
171 See id.
172 NATION CODE tit. 15, §§ 601-19 (Equity 1990).
173 Id.
174 The Act provides that non-Navajos legally married to Navajos receive secon-
dary preference. Non-Navajo spouses are treated as "Navajo" employees for other
purpose of the Act, including the provisions requiring just cause for termination. Id.
at § 614.
175 See HANNUM, supra note 24, at 91 (noting that the ability to foster connection
to homelands by creating economic opportunities is one of the benefits associated
with sovereignty); MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER,
AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE 145-46 (1995) (discussing economic development as a
function of sovereignty).
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kill off any vestiges of tribal language and culture. 7 6 This was as
true for Navajo as for other Indian tribes. The Treaty of 1868
promises that the federal government will fund education, but it
is an "English education" that is provided, and the treaty lan-
guage reflects the coercive and paternalistic attitude of that
time.'77 When the Navajo returned from Bosque Redondo, the
U.S. military built the first schools, and troops were then sent out
to round up Navajo children, often forcibly separating them from
their families.' 78 "English education" meant not only that chil-
dren would learn the English language, but that they would not
be able to wear their hair long, speak their language, or learn
about their traditions and cultures. 179 In part, the distance be-
tween home and the boarding schools accomplished the assimila-
tion goals. Families often only saw their school-aged children
during winter and summer holidays. What distance could not do
alone, the teachers themselves ensured, punishing students for
speaking to each other in their native languages and even giving
the children new English names. 8 °
The Navajo Nation thus faces a significant challenge to turn
education from a threatening, negative influence into one that
can provide positive opportunities. 8' To meet this challenge, the
Navajo Tribal Council passed a law requiring all schools on the
Navajo Nation to teach Navajo language and culture in all
grades.' 8 2 The Din6 Division of Education oversees the imple-
mentation of the law, assisting the many state public schools on
the Navajo Nation to meet the requirement through its Office of
Din6 Language, Culture & Community.'83 The Navajo literature
repeatedly expresses the link between inherent sovereign powers
and the ability to take steps to preserve Navajo language and
176 See Dussias, Ghost Dance, supra note 28, at 776-805; Dussias, Waging War
With Words, supra note 28, at 905-21.
177 Treaty with the Navajo Tribe of Indians, June 1, 1868, art. 6, 15 Stat. 667.
178 Claudeen Bates Arthur, The Role of the Tribal Attorney, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 21,
22 (2002).
17 9 See id.
180 See MICHAEL C. COLEMAN, AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN AT SCHOOL, 1850-
1930 (1993).
181 See Bates Arthur, supra note 178, at 22 (discussing how education as an
outside influence created disruptions to Navajo culture, including displacing the
Navajo traditional attitude of respect toward children).
182 NATION CODE tit. 10, § 111 (Equity 1984) (requiring instruction in Navajo lan-
guage); id. § 112 (requiring instruction in Navajo culture).
183 See Office of Din6 Language, Culture & Community, Mission Statement and
Statement of Purpose (on file with author).
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culture. The preamble to the Din6 Office of Language, Culture
& Community's programs states: "The Navajo Tribe, as a sover-
eign nation, has a responsibility to its people to oversee the edu-
cation in whatever schools or school systems they are being
educated."''
In addition, the Din6 Office of Education asserts the subse-
quent link between the preservation of language and culture and
the survival of the Navajo as a people. With respect to language,
"The Navajo Language is an essential element of the life, culture,
and identity of the Navajo people. The Navajo Nation recognizes
the importance of preserving and perpetuating that language for
the survival of the Navajo Nation." '185 And regarding culture:
The survival of the Navajo Nation as a unique group of people
growing and developing socially, educationally, economically,
and politically within the larger American Nation requires that
the Navajo People and those who reside with the Navajo Peo-
ple retain and/or develop an understanding, knowledge and
respect for the Navajo culture, history, civics and social
studies. 86
The success of these educational initiatives is not yet known.
Some have expressed skepticism about whether Navajo educa-
tional bureaucracies can do any better than other bureaucracies
at reinforcing culture. 87 The younger generations of Navajo
speak the language at far lower rates than the older genera-
tions.'88 In 1930, seventy-one percent of Navajos spoke no En-
glish, as compared to seventeen percent of the rest of the Indian
population.' 89  Since that time, the number of Navajo-only
speakers has dropped while the number of English-only speakers
has risen. 190 The numbers are particularly notable among the
young. In the mid-1970s, more than ninety-five percent of stu-




187 See Bates Arthur, supra note 178, at 24 (lamenting that implementation of
programs to restore Navajo language and culture has not matched planning for such
programs).
188 See James Crawford, Endangered Native American Languages: What Is to Be
Done, and Why? (1994), reprinted in LANGUAGE AND POLITICS IN THE U.S. AND
CANADA: MYTHS AND REALITIES (Thomas Ricento & Barbara Burnaby eds., 1998),
available at http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/JWCrawford/brj. htm (last




rural and remote communities on the Navajo Nation) spoke Nav-
ajo, whereas by 1995 that percentage had dropped to approxi-
mately fifty percent.191 Cable and satellite television are proving
to be better assimilators than government and religious boarding
schools. Yet without tribal initiatives to preserve language and
culture, there would be virtually no chance that language and
culture could survive and adapt in the unique Navajo way.
With its inherent power to regulate and adjudicate, the Navajo
Nation has taken many significant steps towards: providing for
peace and security, through its respected and fair court system;
economic opportunities, both by protecting consumers and em-
ployees; and furthering Navajo cultural practices, by incorporat-
ing Navajo law into judicial decision making, by taking steps to
encourage tribal members to stay within the Navajo Nation, and
by incorporating Navajo language and culture into education.
The Supreme Court's decisions recognizing inherent tribal pow-
ers and limiting the reach of state jurisdiction appear, from these
examples, to have provided room for a distinctly Navajo political
and cultural life to continue.
b. Responding to Concurrent State Authority to Regulate
Notwithstanding Williams v. Lee, McClanahan, and Fisher v.
District Court, the Supreme Court in the modern era has also
decided several Category B cases that recognize state jurisdiction
within Indian country. Most of these cases arise in the context of
taxing jurisdiction, and therefore are discussed in detail in Part
I.C.2.b, below. An overlooked side-effect of these concurrent
taxation cases, however, is their implicit recognition of the states'
obligation to provide services to tribal members who reside in
Indian country.
In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, the Court hinged its
decision to allow states to tax non-Indian activity in Indian coun-
try in part on the services provided by the state to the tribe and
tribal members. 9 2 The obligation of states to provide certain
services is constitutionally based. At the end of the allotment
era, Congress passed.a statute that declared that all American
191 James Crawford, Seven Hypotheses on Language Loss: Causes and Cures, in
STABILIZING INDIGENOUS LANGUAGES (Gina Cantoni ed., 1996), available at http://
www.ncela.gwu.edu/pubs/stabilize/ii-policy/hypotheses.htm.
192 490 U.S. 163, 189-91 (1989).
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Indian tribal members would henceforth be U.S. citizens. 193 Pur-
suant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution, American Indian tribal members are also therefore
citizens of the states where they reside. A string of cases in
which tribal members have pressed for their rights to equal state
services confirm that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protec-
tion guarantees apply to them, notwithstanding the complication
of their political membership in an Indian tribe.194 Navajo tribal
members and the Navajo Nation itself have relied on this line of
authority in order to obtain benefits for tribal members that al-
low them to continue living on the Navajo Nation.
The provision of adequate local education is a clear prerequi-
site to encouraging tribal members to stay in the Din6 homeland.
Yet the history of education of American Indian children pushes
strongly against this goal. The assimilation era forced boarding
schools on many tribal member children, 95 and the extremely
rural nature of the Navajo Nation exacerbates the tendency to
export children in order to educate them. The Indian Self-Deter-
mination and Education Assistance Act promoted the develop-
ment of local tribally run schools. 196 But the majority of Navajo
children, like the majority of all American Indian children, today
are educated in public schools.' 97 The Fourteenth Amendment
obligates states to provide equal educational opportunities to tri-
bal member children. Navajo parents and the Navajo Nation
have therefore used the state obligation to further the goals of
local, adequate, and even culturally and language-appropriate
education. In a series of cases beginning in the 1970s and contin-
uing through the 1990s, Navajo parents sued local school districts
in New Mexico, Utah, and Arizona in order to force the con-
193 Indian Citizenship Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(2000)).
194 See Sinajini v. Bd. of Educ. of San Juan Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th
Cir. 2000); Meyers v. Bd. of Educ. of San Juan Sch. Dist., 905 F. Supp. 1544, 1578-79
(D. Utah 1995) (citing to many other cases recognizing equal protection rights of
American Indians).
195 Bates Arthur, supra note 178, at 22.
196 Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450(a)-450(n)
(2000)).
197 See Jon Rehyner, American Indian/Alaska Native Education: An Overview
(2002) (stating that figures from the 1990s indicate that eighty-seven percent of
American Indian children are educated in public schools), at http://jan. ucc.nau.edu/
-jar/AIE/IndEd.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
struction of public schools on the reservation, 198 equal funding of
existing schools,199 and provision of appropriate cultural and lan-guage curriculum. 200 In two cases, the Navajo Nation joined as aplaintiff.2°' While it might seem anomalous to assert the sover-
eign right to be free from state authority in some circumstances,
and yet to sue the state to provide services in others, the compli-
cated hand that "domestic dependent nations '20 2 have been dealt
requires flexibility in terms of strategies. State public schools are
a staple of American Indian reservation life. The federal govern-
ment has chosen to meet its obligation to educate American In-dian children in part by providing funding to state schooldistricts, both through the ability to tax non-Indian activity in In-dian country2°3 and more directly through a variety of federalfunds that compensate for lost tax revenue and/or provide addi-tional funds for the special needs of American Indian children.204States are paid, in other words, to assist them in meeting their
constitutional obligations. Thus, while the best long-term solu-tion might be to replace state public schools with tribal schools,for the foreseeable future Navajo children will attend schools runby the states. Requiring states to provide adequate, local, cultur-
ally appropriate educational programs is one way of assuring aNavajo future for tribal children. 215
The Navajo Nation has also recruited the state as an initially
unwilling partner in the problem of child support enforcementfor tribal members. The federal statute requiring states to pro-
vide child support enforcement services for recipients of welfare
198 Sinajini, 233 F.3d at 1239; Meyers, 905 F. Supp. at 1553.199 Natonabah v. Bd. of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D. N.M. 1973); Yazzie v.Governing Bd. of the Flagstaff Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV94-PCT-2380-SMM (D.Ariz. Dec. 23, 1998) (including the agreement of the parties and order of dismissal).200 Meyers, 905 F. Supp. at 1553; Yazzie, supra note 199.
201 Sinajini, 233 F.3d at 1236; Meyers, 905 F. Supp. at 1551.
202 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1831).
203 See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 189-91 (1989).204 20 U.S.C. § 236-39 (repealed 1994) (providing funding to school districts to
compensate for lost tax base due to Indian reservation); Johnson-O'Malley Act of1934, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 456 (2000) (providing funding for supplemental pro-grams for Indian children attending public schools).205 See Consent Decree at 8, Meyers v. Bd. of Educ., 905 F. Supp. 1544 (D. Utah1997) (No. 93-C-1080J) (on file with author). This Consent Decree also acknowl-edges tribal and federal obligations. The Navajo Nation has entered into coopera-tive agreements to facilitate the state provision of education. While theseagreements are not always easily arrived at, nor flawlessly implemented, they areanother example of government-to-government relationships created to address thecomplications of the legal and factual realities of multiple sovereigns.
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omitted any reference to Indian tribes. 20 6 Tribes therefore had
no direct access to the federal funds that accompanied the man-
date.2"7 The Navajo Nation, spurred on by indigent tribal mem-
bers who had been denied state enforcement services, negotiated
with New Mexico and Arizona and ultimately achieved a solu-
tion that brought some child support enforcement services to the
reservation.2 °8
As the examples of public education and child support demon-
strate, the Navajo Nation and Navajo tribal members have re-
sponded flexibly to the issue of concurrent state authority in
Indian country. While many Navajo officials likely believe that
the best long-term solutions are clear territorial boundaries and
increased funding and autonomy for the Nation to provide its
own services,20 9 that day is not at hand. In the meantime, Cot-
ton's legal framework of overlapping authority and responsibility
for services has resulted in context-specific tactics that attempt to
ensure that the needs of Navajo Nation residents can be met.
These tactics, while legally defensible, are not lacking in politi-
cal costs. It is difficult for non-Indians to comprehend the com-
plicated web of federal, state, and tribal services that, for better
or worse, the federal government has fostered as the means to
serve on-reservation Indians. Non-Indian hostility to tribal sov-
ereignty has at times been heightened by tribal efforts to secure
the state portions of these services.210 In the context of educa-
206 42 U.S.C. § 654 (2000); see Nancy Rank, Beyond Jurisprudential Midrash: To-
ward a Human Solution to Title IV-D Child Support Enforcement Problems Across
Indian Country Borders, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 337, 340-43 (1991).
207 Rank, supra note 206, at 340-43.
208 See U.S. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 19TH ANNUAL REPORT,
ch. 4 (describing the New Mexico program), at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/ programs/
cse/rpt/ch4a.htm (last visited March 18, 2005); NAT'L TRIBAL CHILD SUPPORT
Ass'N, TRIBAL CHILD SUPPORT PROGRAM INFORMATION AND RESOURCE GUIDE
(describing Navajo child support in Arizona and New Mexico), at http://
www.supporttribalchildren.orgFTribalIVDandNonlVDProgramnfopdf (last modi-
fied July 1, 2004).
209 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Raymond C. Etcitty, supra note 2 (noting
that overlapping governmental authority causes confusion, apprehension, and fear
on the part of those who are regulated). "State and Navajo Nation laws don't neces-
sarily complement one another." Id.
210 THOMAS BIoLSI, "DEADLIEST ENEMIES": LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE
RELATIONS ON AND OFF ROSEBUD RESERVATION 120 (2001) (describing non-In-
dian reactions in South Dakota to unique legal status of tribal members). In this
impressive account of how federal Indian law constructs race relations and racializes
local conflicts between tribes and non-Indians, Biolsi states, quoting the South Da-
kota Governor, that "[ilt seemed inevitable that non-Indians would find it difficult
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tion litigation, for example, non-Indians have questioned why
tribes appear to assert a territorial vision of sovereignty in one
breath and yet demand that the state provide on-reservation fa-
cilities in another.211 These reactions are not impossible to over-
come, and the gains to Navajo children of, for example, having a
local public high school to attend may outweigh the cost of per-
petuating some non-Indian misunderstanding. But it is impor-
tant to consider these reactions and the extent to which they
may, in the long run, militate toward solutions in federal law that
draw clearer tribal/state boundaries.
c. Effects of Categorical Limitations on Tribal Inherent Power
to Regulate and Adjudicate
The Supreme Court has gradually moved away from the vision
it appeared to endorse in Williams, of tribal nations governing
the actions of tribal members and non-members (including non-
Indians) within tribal boundaries, to one of tribal jurisdiction by
consent.212 Rather than adopt flexible standards for determining
whether non-member criminal or civil activity has a sufficient
nexus to tribal territory to warrant tribal jurisdiction, the Court
has devised categorical rules prohibiting tribal authority over
non-members in discrete circumstances.
In the civil context, the Court's categorical rules have emerged
in a piecemeal fashion. Indeed, as discussed below, the most re-
cent case depriving tribes of civil jurisdiction is so piecemeal that
it arguably undermines the categorical framework entirely. 213
Recall that in Worcester v. Georgia, Justice Marshall held that
states lacked jurisdiction in Indian country because "the United
States of America acknowledge[s] the said Cherokee nation to
be a sovereign nation, authori[z]ed to govern themselves, and all
to stomach the fact 'that Indian persons are not subject to taxation by the state, yet
they enjoy other rights of citizenship such as voting for state officials."' Id.
211 My source for these reactions is my own interactions with public school offi-
cials in the course of litigating two "equal access to public education" cases. In addi-
tion, several colleagues who read earlier drafts quite understandably were puzzled
by the positions asserted by tribes in the state services cases.
212 See generally L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the
Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1996) (discussing trend in case law towardjurisdiction by consent, whether through consensual membership in the tribe or indi-
vidual consent of non-members to jurisdiction).
213 See infra notes 232-39 and accompanying text (discussing Nevada v. Hicks, 533
U.S. 353 (2001)).
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"1214 npersons who have settled within their territory, One legacy of
allotment has been to leave geographic holes in tribal territory-
patchworks of on-reservation land consisting of some tribal trust
land, some Indian trust allotments, and some non-Indian fee
land.215 The Court has translated the holes in land title into juris-
dictional holes.
First, in Montana v. United States, the Court held that tribes
lack regulatory authority over non-Indians residing on non-In-
dian fee land within reservation boundaries.216 The case in-
volved a tribe's attempt to regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing within tribal territorial boundaries. Looking not to any
explicit congressional deprivation of tribal powers, but to the
Court's own sense of the limits history had placed on tribal inher-
ent powers, the Court decided that because the non-Indians lived
on lands that they owned in fee, they were not subject to tribal
regulations unless they had engaged in "consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, con-
tracts, leases or other arrangements," '217 or if their conduct
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." '218 The
Court then found that the non-Indians did not have a consensual
relationship with the tribe, and that the tribe's inability to regu-
late hunting and fishing on islands of fee land within their bound-
aries would not have a "direct effect" on the tribe.2 19
After Montana, there was reason to believe that tribes re-
tained inherent authority to regulate non-Indians for activities
occurring on tribal trust lands, whether or not the circumstances
outlined in what have become known as the "Montana excep-
tions" were present. Williams, after all, held that tribes had ex-
clusive judicial authority over disputes between non-Indian
plaintiffs and tribal member defendants. Montana itself ap-
peared to assume tribal inherent authority over activity on tribal
lands, and to exclude such lands from its analysis.22 ° Perhaps
most persuasively, the first part of the Montana opinion ad-
214 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 538 (1832) (emphasis added).
215 See Royster, supra note 27, at 12-13.
216 450 U.S. 544, 561-66 (1981).
217 Id. at 565.
2 18 Id. at 556.
2 19 Id.
220 See id. at 565 (addressing circumstances in which tribes may assert jurisdiction
on fee lands, and not addressing retained powers on trust lands).
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dressed the question whether the tribe retained title to the bed of
the Big Horn River, access to which was part of the tribe's regu-
latory scheme.22' If the Montana holding governed tribal author-
ity over non-Indians notwithstanding land status, then all of Part
I of the Court's opinion was unnecessary dicta. Two cases follow-
ing Montana, Brendale,222 and South Dakota v. Bourland,223
continued the practice of determining land status as a pre-requi-
site to addressing tribal jurisdiction. As in Montana, there would
have been no need to identify lands as fee lands as in Brendale,
or land appropriated by the U.S. government as in Bourland, if
the Montana rule applied regardless of land status.
There was also the possibility that Montana would not apply to
tribal powers other than the power to regulate. On one level,
distinguishing between the power to regulate and the power to
adjudicate or tax seems to slice governmental powers in arbitrary
ways. Legal rules are enforced whether through the common law
norms produced by adjudication or the clear statements of tribal
councils. But Indian law cases had been slicing and dicing up
tribal powers (and immunities) in arbitrary ways throughout the
modern era. The tribal power to tax appeared to have the
strongest support from the Court.22 4 And the Supreme Court
had also been deferential to the tribal power to adjudicate, even
in cases involving non-Indians.225 Furthermore, striving for co-
herence on the subject of tribal powers over non-Indians would
be at the expense of coherence with significant legal norms. The
first of these is the underlying norm of Indian law itself-the
norm of not perpetuating, or at least tempering, the colonial rela-
tionship with Indian nations. 2 6 This norm holds that there is lit-
tle justification in democratic theory for the judicial branch to
strip our "dependent nations" of governmental powers when
Congress has not clearly done so. 227 Another cluster of norms
221 Id. at 551 (addressing whether the State of Montana obtained title to the bed
of the Big Horn River under the equal footing doctrine).
222 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (discussing Brendale).
223 508 U.S. 679, 688-689 (1993).
224 See infra notes 324-32 and accompanying text (discussing Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) and Kerr-McGee v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195
(1985)).
225 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing Williams v. Lee); see
also supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text (discussing National Farmers and
Iowa Mutual).
226 See Frickey, supra note 13, at 13.
227 See id.; Singer, supra note 12, at 665-67.
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involves our usual presumptions about the kinds of relationships
that establish governmental authority. For example, state courts
have personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants because
they have ties to activity in the state and should expect to be sued
there.228 Political membership is irrelevant to the analysis. But
instead of opting for normative coherence or horizontal coher-
ence with other fields of law, the Supreme Court has opted for
coherence with a narrow reading of Montana.
Describing Montana as the "pathmarking case," the Court
held, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, that the Montana rule applied
to determine whether a tribal court had subject matter jurisdic-
tion over a case involving a non-Indian plaintiff and a non-Indian
defendant that arose on a state highway running through the
tribe's reservation.229 Rather than rule that Montana applies to
all questions of tribal authority over non-Indians, the Court al-
igned the state highway, which was a right-of-way granted by the
tribe, with non-Indian fee land for the purpose of its jurisdic-
tional analysis.23° Strate answered one of the doctrinal questions
left open by Montana, which was whether Montana would apply
to forms of tribal governmental authority other than legislative
regulation. The Court answered this question in the affirmative,
finding no distinction between regulatory and adjudicative au-
thority.231 By aligning the right-of-way with non-Indian fee land,
the Court avoided another question, however, which is whether
Montana applies to all non-Indian activity in Indian country re-
gardless of land status.
Nevada v. Hicks appears to address this question head-on.232
In Hicks, Floyd Hicks, a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone
Indian Tribe, filed suit against state officials in tribal court, alleg-
ing violations of federal and tribal law arising from state officials'
search of Hicks's home, which was located on tribal trust land.
2 33
The Court refused to apply a presumption that tribal land status
conferred jurisdiction on the tribe. Rather, the Court stated that
"ownership status ... is only one factor to consider in determin-
228 See Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1260 (suggesting that Strate v. A-I Contractors,
520 U.S. 438 (1997), could have turned on considerations relevant in the personal
jurisdiction context rather than on the defendant's status).
229 520 U.S. 438, 445, 456 (1997).
230 Id. at 456.
231 Id. at 453.
232 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001).
233 Id. at 356.
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ing whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is 'neces-
sary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations."' 2 34 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia,
never said in so many words that Montana now applies to all
questions of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.235 But in a
separate concurrence, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, Justice
Souter urged that the opinion be read that way.2 36 In addition,
Justice O'Connor concurred to state that Montana controls, but
then went on to disagree with the majority's analysis of whether
either of the Montana exceptions apply. She, along with Justice
Stevens, would have remanded the case for further consideration
of whether, pursuant to Montana, the tribe had jurisdiction.237
Thus while the majority opinion is somewhat muddy and laden
with dicta concerning the Court's overwhelming concern for the
state defendants,238 the case stands for the imposition of some
form of Montana analysis onto all questions of tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians.239
The Supreme Court's decisions in Montana, Strate, and Hicks
limiting tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians have had a
range of impacts on the Navajo Nation. First, in the expressive
category, Navajo tribal officials and other tribal members have
reacted strongly to what they perceive to be an attack on their
separate existence. Second, litigants seeking relief in tribal court
must often wade through several layers of jurisdictional proceed-
ings in tribal and federal court before obtaining a final answer to
the question of whether the tribal court can hear their claims.
Third, the transactional environment for the Navajo Nation has
been negatively affected by the apparent flip in presumptions
concerning tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian activity. And re-
lated to these impacts, non-Indian resistance to tribal substantive
234 Id. at 360 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
235 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360; see also Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1235-36
(describing how Hicks might be read as adopting a balancing test for all questions of
tribal civil jurisdiction).
236 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 375 (Souter, J., concurring).
237 Id. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238 See, e.g., id. at 361 (discussing needs of state law enforcement officials and
stating, gratuitously, that "[s]tate sovereignty does not end at a reservation's
border").
239 At least one circuit court, however, has found that Hicks does not apply to all
cases arising on Indian trust land. McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding that Hicks is limited to its facts and that the Montana rule therefore
only applies on non-Indian fee land).
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law affects the Navajo Nation's ability to safeguard, through em-
ployment and tort law, the economic and physical security of
Navajo tribal members.
Navajo tribal officials, in both formal and informal statements,
have condemned the Supreme Court's decisions limiting tribal
inherent powers. In various ways, these officials express the link
that they see between sovereignty and survival of the Navajo
people. As noted in this Article's introduction, former Chief Jus-
tice of the Navajo Nation Robert Yazzie describes the Court's
decisions as creating the "threat of cultural, economic, and politi-
cal genocide. '2 40 These are strong words, and yet they are not
the isolated perceptions of one Navajo Justice. Navajo Nation
Legislative Counsel Raymond Etcitty concludes that the federal
courts "are trying to do what the federal, executive, [and legisla-
tive] branch[es] have learned they cannot do-eliminate
tribes."2 4 ' Mr. Etcitty also describes what he sees as hypocrisy in
the Supreme Court's decisions on at least two fronts. First, the
Court's solicitude for federalism illogically stops at respect for
the separate political approaches of Indian nations. "What about
the concept of laboratories for democracy?" Etcitty wonders,
paraphrasing the famous quote by Justice Brandeis.242 Second,
Etcitty asks with evident frustration and anger, "How does the
U.S. government have the audacity to tell other governments
what to do with their indigenous people when it doesn't deal ap-
propriately with its own?" '2 43
Some Navajo Nation officials also express anger at the very
notion that they must now, as they describe it, go begging to
Congress to restore their inherent powers.244 The paradox of tri-
bal sovereignty is not lost on these tribal officials, and to them it
is more than merely an academic problem. Every day they seek
to enforce the laws of what is, in every significant sense to them,
a separate political nation with a legal system and culture stretch-
ing back over the millennia. And then pieces of paper arrive
from Washington telling them, in effect, that their nation does
240 Testimony of Chief Justice Yazzie, supra note 10.
241 Telephone Interview with Raymond C. Etcitty, supra note 2.
242 Id. (referring to New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
243 Telephone Interview with Raymond C. Etcitty, supra note 2.
244 Interview with Justices Claudeen Bates Arthur and Lorene Ferguson, supra
note 170.
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not exist.245 Chief Justice Claudeen Bates Arthur put it this way:
"[A]ny time you [have to] ask the [federal government] to take
action on something that you consider to be an inherent power, it
is like being a child asking for the blessings of the father. 246
Raymond Etcitty voices similar sentiments. As he sees it, the
source of Navajo Nation sovereignty is the Navajo people; the
federal government did not grant sovereignty and the federal
government cannot take it away.247
Another recurring theme in the responses of Navajo Nation
officials is that the Court's decisions are based, at least in part, on
ignorance. Etcitty does not mince words: "Ignorance drives the
Court's decisions. '248 In particular, Etcitty cites to the Court's
lack of knowledge about Navajo concepts of due process, which
he believes contributes to the Court's reluctance to submit non-
Indians to tribal jurisdiction.2 49 "Our concept of 'Nalyeeh,' is
more generous than due process," Etcitty asserts, referring to a
Navajo common-law concept that embodies principles of fair
treatment and restitution.25 ° Navajo Nation Supreme Court Jus-
tice Lorene Ferguson comments that there was a time when the
federal government understood Indian issues. She believes that
time has passed, and that today the Court and Executive Branch
appear alternately ignorant and hostile.25 1 Navajo Nation Dis-
trict Court Judge Allen Sloan believes that part of the challenge
for the Navajo Nation is countering the notion that all Indian
nations and tribal courts are the same.252 Smaller tribes with
fragmented land bases create an image in the minds of the mem-
bers of the U.S. Supreme Court,253 and the Navajo Nation is
challenged to supplant that image. As Judge Sloan puts it:
The problem for the Navajo is that there is no chart in front of
the nine justices which shows the extent of Navajo country. In
every Indian case where subject matter jurisdiction has been
considered, there is the idea that [the tribes] have unwritten
245 See id.
246 Id.
247 Telephone Interview with Raymond C. Etcitty, supra note 2.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.; see also Robert Yazzie, 'Life Comes From It': Navajo Justice Concepts, 24
N.M. L. REv. 175, 184-85 (1994) (explaining Navajo concept of Nalyeeh).
251 Interview with Justices Claudeen Bates Arthur and Lorene Ferguson, supra
note 170.
252 Interview with Allen Sloan, Navajo Nation Dist. Ct. Judge, Window Rock,
Ariz. (July 9, 2003) (notes on file with author).
253 See id.
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laws, or make up laws as they go along, and [non-Indians]
shouldn't be subject to their "tee-pee justice." The Supreme
Court decisions are assumptions building upon assumptions,
which then become reality.154
The comments of these Navajo Nation officials, in both tenor
and substance, indicate the extent to which Navajo tribal mem-
bers perceive their distinctness as a people to be bound up with
their political existence as a sovereign. This is so notwithstanding
the fact that, on an intellectual level, many tribal members recog-
nize that the legal doctrine of American Indian tribal sovereignty
places tribes perpetually at risk of unilateral extinguishment by
Congress.255 There seems to be something particularly trouble-
some to the Navajo officials about the Court attempting to do
what they know full well could happen, at least theoretically, in
the legislative branch.256 These sentiments are grounded in polit-
ical reality. Since the late 1960s, the federal executive and legis-
lative branches have generally supported tribal sovereignty,25 7
and tribal lobbying efforts have become a mainstay of American
Indian politics. 25 8 Tribal officials are therefore sensible to per-
ceive that the representative branches of government are not the
greater threat to tribal survival at this historical moment. And,
interestingly, Navajo expressions of sovereignty resonate with
similar expressions of concern raised in the federalism context.259
While proponents of states' rights may assert that at least their
claims to sovereignty are grounded in the structure of the Consti-
tution, it is unclear whether this makes their states' rights claims
stronger or weaker than those of tribes.26 ° Claims of Indian tri-
254 Id.
255 Telephone Interview with Raymond C. Etcitty, supra note 2.
256 See id.; Interview with Justices Claudeen Bates Arthur and Lorene Ferguson,
supra note 170.
257 See Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1204-05.
2 58 See generally ROBERT L. BEE, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
(1982) (analyzing the "Washington connection," described as the inevitable interface
between tribal governments and policy makers in Congress and the executive
branch).
259 See generally, e.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDER-
ALISM (2001) (providing a vigorous defense of state sovereignty and criticizing the
Court's recent federalism decisions for not going far enough to protect states'
rights).
260 In the federalism context, the Supreme Court's recent stance with respect to
sovereignty is the opposite of that in the Indian law context; the Court has engaged
in judicial review in order to strike down federal laws that interfere with state sover-
eignty. See generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). Even commentators
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bal sovereignty do not depend on any document of positive law
internal to the United States.26' While American domestic law
has nonetheless proceeded unilaterally to define the legal status
of tribes, it is at least arguable that the origin of tribal sover-
eignty is more consistent with some philosophical notions of a
"sovereign" than the already-compromised sovereignty of states
that emerges from the Constitution.262 Even staunch federalists
have to concede that states originally consented to cede some of
their sovereignty to form the government of the United States.263
The staunchest proponents of American Indian tribal sovereignty
need not do so.264
In terms of impacts on practical governance, there is evidence
to suggest that the concerns of Navajo officials are warranted.
Navajo consumer protection and employment laws, in which the
Navajo Nation has exercised its sovereign powers to serve the
functions of providing economic security as discussed above in
Part I.C.l.a., face uncertainty as a result of the Supreme Court's
cases. Tort cases filed in Navajo courts are also vulnerable. Non-
Indian litigants are more prone to challenge the tribe's jurisdic-
tion over them in these cases, which creates prolonged uncer-
tainty regarding the application of Navajo law. Such challenges
may ultimately result in federal decisions that non-Indians, even
when they engage in substantial activity in Indian country that
depends upon Navajo labor and services of various kinds, are not
subject to Navajo law at all.
sympathetic to federalist arguments about the functions of state government have
criticized the Court's approach as lacking in both historical justification and any rea-
sonable doctrinal limitations. See id. at 291-93. In other words, the Constitution
protects state sovereignty by providing for state representation in Congress, not by
assigning to federal courts the role of preserving platonic notions of state sover-
eignty. See id.
261 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Raymond C. Etcitty, supra note 2.
262 Some conceptions of sovereignty would rule out both state sovereignty in a
federal system and American Indian tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE
CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 8 (2d ed. 1980) (describing John Austin's four charac-
teristics of sovereignty, which include that it is not subordinate, and that it is illimita-
ble, unique, and united in one person or body). Others, however, define sovereignty
more flexibly, centering on either consensual and/or cultural ties that bind a commu-
nity within a given territory to a form of government. See, e.g., David Luban, The
Romance of the Nation State, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 238, 239 (Charles Beitz et
al. eds., 1985).
263 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
264 See Clinton, supra note 44, at 115-16 ("[U]nlike the legal primacy the federal
government enjoys over states by virtue of the Supremacy Clause ... the federal
government has no legitimate claim to legal supremacy over Indian tribes.").
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With respect to all civil cases involving non-Indian defendants,
Navajo Nation district court judges report that jurisdictional
challenges have risen since Strate was decided.265 Thus, even
though the Strate decision presented itself as a straightforward
application of Montana, it was Strate and not Montana that
changed the litigation environment dramatically. As Luralene
Tapahe, an attorney in the Navajo Nation Department of Justice,
describes it, "It started to go downhill when Strate was decided.
Before that, Merrion seemed to be the rule." '2 66 In other words,
as Ms. Tapahe explains, until Strate, non-Indians for the most
part assumed that they were subject to Navajo civil laws when
they were on the Navajo Nation; Strate changed that.267 Further-
more, lawyers who represent tribal members report that the post-
Strate environment makes Navajo judges more tentative about
their rulings on jurisdictional issues. 268 At least one district court
judge, T.J. Holgate, denied that this is the case. Asked whether
Navajo judges were inclined to be wary of asserting tribal juris-
diction, Judge Holgate responded, "Why worry about it? . . .
Why deplete my energy for that? . . . [I] don't worry about
whether my decision is going to be overturned in the next venue,
[and I'm] not going to be conservative if it's not proper [under
the law]." 2 69 Chief Justice Arthur expressed a slightly different
view, stating that the specter of the next Supreme Court case on
tribal jurisdiction has made Navajo judges extremely conscious of
non-Indian perceptions of fairness.27 °
Whether the federal law makes Navajo judges unduly cautious
or not, the jurisdictional challenges clearly delay resolution on
the merits of many cases. Judges Holgate and Sloan attest to the
consumption of time and resources on jurisdictional matters.27'
A review of federal cases addressing Navajo tribal court jurisdic-
tion confirms this perception. In the employment context, since
265 Interview with Judges Holgate and Sloan, supra note 166.
266 Interview with Luralene Tapahe, Staff Attorney, Navajo Nation Department
of Justice, in Window Rock, Ariz. (Dec. 11, 2003) (on file with author) (referring to
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982)).
267 See id.
268 Telephone Interview with Veronika Fabian, Attorney and Former Consumer
Law Project Director for DNA-Peoples Legal Services (June 7, 2003) (on file with
author).
269 Interview with Judges Holgate and Sloan, supra note 166.
270 Interview with Justices Claudeen Bates Arthur and Lorene Ferguson, supra
note 170.
271 Id.; Interview with Judges Holgate and Sloan, supra note 166.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
Strate was decided, three cases have reached the federal courts
regarding whether employers are subject to the Navajo Nation
Preference in Employment Act.272 One of the cases, Wide Ruins
Community School, Inc. v. Stago, involved a tribal member plain-
tiff who had sued a tribal school located on tribal lands.273 Even
after Strate and Hicks, those facts clearly support tribal court ju-
risdiction, and indeed the federal district court dismissed the de-
fendants' challenge. 274 That the defendants resisted tribal court
jurisdiction even in such a clear case provides some indication of
the post-Strate litigation climate. In another employment case,
Atkinson Trading Company ("Atkinson"), owner of the Cam-
eron Trading Post,275 challenged the application of the Navajo
Nation Preference in Employment Act to a claim filed by a Nav-
ajo employee.276 The employee alleged that Atkinson termi-
nated her without providing her the procedural protections of
the Act.27 7 Her claim stemmed from her employment contract
with Atkinson. The tribal member's employment claim against
Atkinson appears to fall squarely within the first Montana excep-
tion, which allows for tribal jurisdiction over contracts with tribal
members, even in the post-Strate world of extremely narrow
readings of this exception.278 Yet, unlike in Wide Ruins,279 the
federal district court nonetheless found that the Navajo Nation
lacked jurisdiction.28 °
Consumer protection and tort cases are similarly subject to ju-
risdictional attack. In the consumer category, Navajo plaintiffs
face increased resistance to the application of the Navajo repos-
session and consumer protection statutes, even when non-Indians
enter into consensual relationships with tribal members residing
272 Wide Ruins Cmty. Sch., Inc. v. Stago, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (D. Ariz. 2003);
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 309 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2002); Atkinson Trading
Co. v. Manygoats, No. 3:02-CV-01566 (2004) (challenging the decision in Manygoats
v. Atkinson Trading Co., SC-CV-62-2000 (Navajo 2003)).
273 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1087 (D. Ariz. 2003).
2 7 4 Id. at 1088.
275 See infra notes 399-400 and accompanying text (discussing the defendant).
276 See Atkinson Trading Co., No. 3:02-CV-01566.
277 Id.
278 See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (discussing Strate's narrow in-
terpretations of Montana exceptions).
279 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
280 See Native Am. Rights Fund, Cases Being Monitored: Atkinson Trading Co.
v. Manygoats (reporting that the U.S. District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Atkinson, and that the case has been appealed and has been referred to
mediation), at http://www.narf.org/cases/index.html (last visited March 29, 2005).
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within the Navajo Nation.281 The case of Halwood v. Cowboy
Auto Sales, Inc. is representative. 282 In Halwood, Navajo plain-
tiffs sought to enforce a tribal court default judgment granting
them compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages for the non-
Indian defendants' wrongful repossession of an automobile on
the Navajo Nation.283 The non-Indian defendants, who initially
failed to appear in tribal court at all, challenged the tribal court
decision on jurisdictional grounds.2" Ultimately the Navajo
plaintiffs prevailed, but only after one round of tribal proceed-
ings and two in the New Mexico state courts.
285
With respect to tort cases, Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene286 is
illustrative. Navajo plaintiffs, whose daughter was killed in a
roll-over accident while driving a Ford Expedition, sued Ford
Motor Company in tribal court alleging products liability
claims.287 Esther Todecheene, the decedent, was driving on a
reservation road maintained by the Navajo Nation in the course
of her employment as a Navajo police officer when her vehicle
rolled over in a single-car accident, ejecting her from her seat.288
The plaintiffs claimed that the Ford Expedition was defective,
and in particular that the seatbelt malfunctioned. 289 Ford filed an
action in federal district court challenging tribal court jurisdic-
tion, and the district court granted Ford's motion to enjoin the
tribal court proceeding.290 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court, further narrowing the arguments available to tribal mem-
ber plaintiffs under the Montana exceptions.
The Ford majority found no consensual relationship to the
tribe or tribal members, notwithstanding a contract between Ford
Motor Credit Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ford Mo-
tor Company, and the Navajo Nation for bulk purchase of Ford
Expeditions. 291 The contract between Ford Credit and the Na-
tion also included a forum selection clause stating that "'[a]ll ac-
281 See Telephone Interview with Veronika Fabian, supra note 268.
282 946 P.2d 1088 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
283 Id. at 1089-90.
284 Id. at 1090-91.
285 See id. at 1094 (upholding tribal court jurisdiction, including imposition of pu-
nitive damages on non-Indian defendants).
286 394 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2005).
287 Id. at 1172.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 1173.
291 Id. at 1179-81.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
tions which arise out of this Lease or out of the transactions it
represents shall be brought in the courts of the Navajo Na-
tion.'- 29 2 The court recognized that "[t]ort law does constitute a
form of regulation," '293 but nonetheless found that a tort claim by
a tribal member was too distant from the consensual lease agree-
ment to fall within the ambit of the consensual relationship
exception.294
The Ford majority also rejected the argument that the Navajo
Nation's inability to impose standards of care on a tribal road in
the context of protecting the health and safety of tribal police
officers met the second Montana exception, which allows for ju-
risdiction over nonmembers when their conduct "threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic se-
curity, or the health or welfare of the tribe. '295 Rather than look
to the Navajo Nation's larger regulatory interest, the court
looked rather myopically to the single incident of the roll-over
accident in this case.296
The Ford Motor decision exemplifies the dilemma for tribes in
the wake of Strate and Hicks with respect to enforcing their own
laws to address serious, reservation-wide problems. As Judge
Fletcher states in his dissenting opinion in Ford,
Not only is this a case about the safety of the tribe's roads.
Not only is this a case about the safety of products sold to
tribal members. This is also a case about the ability of a tribe
to ensure the safety of its police officers as those officers drive
on tribal roads, protecting tribal members and enforcing tribal
law.
297
It may be true that no single accident threatens the health or
welfare of the Navajo Nation. Taken as a whole, however, auto
accidents are among the leading causes of death on the Navajo
Nation.298 These everyday tragedies are familiar to anyone who
has spent time in Indian country. Everyone knows someone who
has been killed in or by a car, leading to the depressing sense that
life is particularly fragile and expendable for Native people.2 99
292 Id. at 1173 (quoting the lease agreement).
293 Id. at 1180.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 1181 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
296 See Ford Motor Co., 394 F.3d at 1182-83.
297 Id. at 1188 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
298 IAN FRAZIER, ON THE REZ 8 (2000) ("Among the Navajo... car accidents are
the leading cause of death.")
299 See generally id. Frazier's book is a vivid and moving depiction of the every-
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The inability to impose standards of care on those who know-
ingly engage in relevant behavior within the Navajo Nation pro-
hibits the tribe from addressing one of the more serious public
health issues within its boundaries.
Finally, the Supreme Court's cases that divest Indian tribes of
categories of civil jurisdiction have compromised the transac-
tional environment for tribes. As a result of Strate and Hicks,
the Navajo Nation has adopted a policy of requiring consent to
tribal jurisdiction in every lease, contract, or other consensual
agreement. 30 0 But every negotiation with a non-Indian business
is now conducted in a context in which non-Indian perceptions of
the uncertainty and strangeness of tribal law are bolstered by
their sense that these laws need not apply to them.30 Obtaining
consent to tribal law and jurisdiction in these circumstances is
awkward if not impossible.30 2 Luralene Tapahe reports that the
Supreme Court's decisions are interfering with the Navajo Na-
tion's ability to enter into agreements concerning rights of way
for electric utilities, pipelines, and business site leases.30 3 Before
Strate, consent to tribal jurisdiction did not raise nearly as much
opposition or concern. 30 4 Post-Strate, the Navajo Nation will not
give up on the consent term, and increasingly the non-Indian
businesses refuse to include it.305 The Court's jurisprudence has
altered jurisdictional expectations in a way that creates barriers
to transactions, and therefore potentially interferes with tribal ec-
onomic development.30 6
day tragedies in Indian country. See, e.g., id. at 32-33, 37, 43, 46, 56-57, 130, 246-47,
254-56, 258. My own experience on the Navajo Nation supports this point as well.
While I was working in Tuba City, the following Navajo friends and acquaintances
lost relatives in car accidents: the receptionist at DNA; a girl whom I coached on the
Tuba City cross-country team; and several clients. Some doctors at the Indian
Health Services hospital in Tuba City began sporting the bumper sticker "Pray for
me and mine. I drive Highway 89," referring to a state highway that runs through
the western portion of the Navajo Nation between Flagstaff and Page, Arizona.
300 See Interview with Luralene Tapahe, supra note 266; Telephone Interview
with Raymond C. Etcitty, supra note 2.





306 Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MiCH. L.
REV. 813, 815-19 (1998). Hills' article demonstrates that anti-commandeering, a fed-
eralism doctrine that protects states from federal overreaching, is irrelevant to deter-
mining how a governing body will act in the context of reaching efficient deals with
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The Supreme Court's cases divesting tribes of categories of
civil jurisdiction have dramatically changed the environment for
the enforcement of Navajo Nation laws. Most pertinent to this
study, the Navajo Nation's ability to provide employment oppor-
tunities through enforcement of the Navajo Nation Preference in
Employment Act appears vulnerable. Providing economic secur-
ity through employment is a key function of sovereignty. Re-
searchers at the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy and the
Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development
have determined that "tribal control over tribal affairs is the only
policy that works for economic development. '30 7 If providing
services and a secure business environment to non-Indian busi-
nesses on the Navajo Nation does not result in the potential to
increase Navajo employment, a significant benefit of economic
development is lost, and that functional aspect of sovereignty is
impaired. Likewise, the sovereign interest in protecting citizens
from unscrupulous and/or harmful behavior through consumer
protection and tort law is at risk due to the instability of tribal
legal jurisdiction.
One positive result from these otherwise negative impacts on
the Navajo Nation is the inter-tribal effort to redress the Su-
preme Court decisions in Congress. 30 8 A document entitled Nav-
ajo Nation Policy Position Response to U.S. Supreme Court
Diminishment of Sovereignty declares, "The Navajo Nation en-
courages all Indian Nations to unite as one, to speak with one
voice, to advocate for true recognition of our inherent sover-
eignty by the United States Congress. ' 30 9 The Navajo Nation's
sense of itself as a sovereign appears, in many ways, to be
strengthened as a result of this effort.310 The Policy Position also
articulates a clear, comprehensible vision about how to restore
another governing body. Id. Relating to the Navajo context is the point that judi-
cial doctrines that alter the boundaries of sovereignty are troublesome when theyinterfere with economic efficiency. Here, in contrast to the anti-commandeering
context, it is the abandonment of dual sovereignty that creates market interference.
307 Stephen Cornell & Jonathan Taylor, Sovereignty, Devolution, and the Future of
Tribal-state Relations, Nat'l Cong. Of Am. Indians Mid-Year Session 4 (June 26,
2000), available at www.udallcenter.arizona.edu/nativenations/pubs/tribal%
20state%20relations.pdf.
308 See Interview with Levon Henry, supra note 166; Res. of the Navajo Nation
Council, CAU-73-01 (2001) (calling for restoration of tribal inherent powers that
have been divested by Supreme Court decisions).
309 Res. of the Navajo Nation Council, CAU-73-01, Exhibit A at 1 (2001).310 See Interview with Levon Henry, supra note 166; Res. of the Navajo Nation
Council, CAU-73-01 (2001).
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inherent tribal powers, and includes flexibility in terms of consid-
ering federal judicial review and enabling tribes to opt in or out,
depending on their willingness to accept that trade-off.31'
Another hopeful sign is the defiant certitude voiced by some
tribal officials regarding the future of the Navajo Nation in the
wake of the Supreme Court's activity. Raymond Etcitty put it
this way:
The Navajo Nation is not going away. We have our own
courts, 300,000 members, and a government that nearly
200,000 people abide by. The fundamental principle is that the
government comes from the people. The government can't be
done away with [by the Supreme Court or any other federal
branch] because the people have formed it. The Constitution
never took away Indian self-governance; that governance
flows from the people. Tribes aren't going to go away.
312
2. Taxation
a. Acting on the Inherent Power to Tax
"The right to tax is an inherent right of the Navajo Nation and
one aspect of its sovereignty. ' 313 This quotation does not come
from a federal case. These are the words of the Navajo Nation
Tribal Council in its 1974 resolution establishing the Navajo Tax
Commission.314 Emboldened by the new era of self-determina-
tion and committed to creating a homeland that could nurture its
people in ways the federal government had repeatedly failed to
do, the Navajo Nation set out to collect revenue to fund pro-
grams. As the Council resolution also stated, "Various studies
and surveys made by and on behalf of the Navajo Tribe have
shown that taxation within a comprehensive taxation program
would be in the best interests of the Navajo people. 315
In the four years following the establishment of the Navajo Tax
Commission, the Commission continued to study the question of
whether and how much to tax.316 In 1978, the first Navajo
311 Res. of the Navajo Nation Council, CAU-73-01, Exhibit A at 3-4 (2001).
312 Telephone Interview with Raymond C. Etcitty, supra note 2.
313 Res. of the Navajo Nation Council, CJA-6-74 (1974) (on file with author).
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 See THE NAVAJO NATION OFFICE OF THE NAVAJO TAx COMM'N, HISTORY OF
THE NAVAJO TAX COMMISSION AND OFFICE OF THE NAVAJO TAx COMMISSION, at
http://www.navajotax.org/new-page-l.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) [hereinafter
HISTORY OF THE NTC].
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taxes-a possessory interest tax317 (hereafter PIT, which is a type
of ad valorem tax) and a business activity tax318 (hereafter BAT,
which is a type of gross receipts tax)-were enacted by the Tribal
Council. In enacting both of these taxes, the Tribal Council again
declared that "[t]he right to tax is part of the inherent sover-
eignty of any Nation. ' 319 In addition, the economic need for the
taxes was articulated: "Navajo population and Navajo needs are
increasing, with the increase in the need for services partly a re-
sult of increased employment and development within the Nav-
ajo Nation. ' 32 ° In these pronouncements, the Council makes
clear the direct link between sovereign authority and revival and
protection of the Navajo people.
Almost as soon as the Navajo Nation BAT and PIT were
passed, non-Indian businesses extracting coal within the Navajo
Nation filed suit, objecting to the taxes on jurisdictional and
other grounds.32' While these cases were winding their way
through the federal courts, the Supreme Court heard two other
challenges to tribal taxes, and in both affirmed the inherent tribal
power to tax.322 First, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation, the Court found that the power to
tax Indians and non-Indians was "a fundamental attribute of sov-
ereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal
law or necessary implication of their dependent status., 323 In
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the Court found the taxing
power to be "an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because
it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial
management. '324 Merrion upheld a tax that the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe imposed on non-Indian lessees who were extracting oil and
gas from tribal trust lands. The non-Indian taxpayers raised sev-
eral arguments, including that the Tribe's tax resulted in multiple
taxation in violation of the Commerce Clause, and that the tribal
power to tax is only coextensive with the tribal power to exclude
317 Res. of the Navajo Nation Council, CJA-13-78 (1978).
318 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CM-36-78 (1978).
319 Id.; Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CJA-13-78.
320 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CM-36-78; Res. of the Navajo Tribal Coun-
cil, CJA-13-78.
321 See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); South-
land Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 715 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1983).
322 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-40 (1982); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1980).
323 447 U.S. at 152.
324 455 U.S. at 137.
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325Thnon-Indians from the reservation. The Court rejected each of
these arguments, and repeatedly stressed the inherent authority
of Indian tribes to tax, as well as the crucial role that taxation
plays for any government to finance governmental services and
activities.326 Merrion, like Williams v. Lee ,327 is a high-water
mark for judicial acknowledgment of tribal powers. It does not
limit the taxing power to tribal members, and it does not follow
the framework laid out in Montana ,328 decided two years before
Merrion, for assessing whether tribes have regulatory authority
over non-Indians. Moreover, it seems to embrace a framework
for assessing tribal inherent powers that is specific to the govern-
mental action at issue. The governmental act in Merrion-taxa-
tion-was held to be at the top of the list of powers of self-
government: the tribal power to tax "derives from the tribe's gen-
eral authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within
its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental
services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises
engaged in economic activities within that jurisdiction.
3 29
The Court decided Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indi-
ans,330 one of the cases challenging the Navajo taxes, three years
after Merrion. As in Merrion, the non-Indian mineral lessees
subject to the tribal taxes were leasing tribal lands. Unlike Mer-
rion, the Secretary of the Interior had not expressly approved the
tribal taxes at issue in Kerr-McGee. The non-Indian lessee chal-
lenged the taxes' validity based on the absence of Secretarial ap-
proval. The Court rejected this argument, finding that
Secretarial approval was not required by any statute, and further-
more that no statute authorizing approval was necessary because
the power to tax is "an essential attribute of self-government."
331
Of particular relevance to the Navajo Nation and its perception
of the strength of future arguments regarding its sovereignty, the
Court concluded by stating that
[t]he Navajo Government has been called "probably the most
elaborate" among tribes. The legitimacy of the Navajo Tribal
325 455 U.S. at 130.
326 Id.
327 358 U.S. 217 (1959); see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing
Williams).
328 450 U.S. 544 (1981); see supra notes 216-19.
329 455 U.S. at 137.
330 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
331 Id. at 201.
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Council, the freely elected governing body of the Navajos, isbeyond question. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
neither Congress nor the Navajos have found it necessary to
subject the Tribal Council's tax laws to review by the Secretary
of the Interior.332
Given the green light to pass taxes in order to raise revenue
and fund essential governmental programs, many tribes passed a
variety of tax provisions. Some of these taxes raised issues that
would later result in de facto and de jure limitations on the tribal
power to tax, as discussed in Part I.C.2.c., below. But the Court's
unambiguous recognition of the tribal power to tax affirmed the
notion of modern tribal sovereignty, in the context of one of the
most important powers possessed by any government. The Nav-
ajo Nation has seized on this power, in both expressive and prac-
tical ways.
In the expressive category, the Navajo Tribal Council, immedi-
ately upon receipt of the Kerr-McGee decision, declared the date
to be a Navajo holiday known as "Navajo Nation Sovereignty
Day. '3 33 The Council announced with evident pride:
The Supreme Court by a vote of 8 to 0, stated that the NavajoTribal Government as a Sovereign Nation has the inherent
right to impose taxes without review and approval of the Sec-
retary of the Interior; and . . . said that the Navajo Govern-
ment, "probably the most elaborate among Tribes," islegitimate and that as a Sovereign Nation has the absolute
right to Self-Government.334
While recognizing and lauding the decision of the Justices in
Washington, D.C., the Tribal Council was also clear to give credit
to the Navajo people themselves: "This landmark decision on be-
half of the Navajo people, as well as all Native American Indian
Nations, reaffirms and conforms [sic] that the Navajo Nation is a
Sovereign Nation; and [this] landmark decision is also a direct
result of the Navajo Nation utilizing its own in-house exper-
tise. 335 It might be surprising, in this era of "no new taxes," to
hear that the power to tax is celebrated in an annual holiday.
The Navajo reaction indicates the strong link that the Navajo
perceive exists between their sovereign powers as a government
and their continued existence as a people.
332 Id. (citations omitted).
333 See Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CMY-35-85 (1985).
334 Id.
335 Id.
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Kerr-McGee also had more concrete effects. Subsequent taxes
enacted by the Navajo Nation include the Oil and Gas Severance
Tax, passed in 1985,336 the Hotel Occupancy Tax, passed in
1992,337 the Tobacco Products Tax,3 38 the Fuel Excise Tax,3 3 9 and
the Sales Tax. 34° The revenue from these taxes constitutes an in-
creasingly significant percentage of the Navajo Nation budget. A
certain percentage of the revenue is earmarked for distribution
to particular funds. These include five percent to the Tax Ad-
ministration Suspense Fund, two percent to the Land Acquisition
Fund, two percent to the Chapter Development Fund, and
twelve percent to the Permanent Trust Fund.3 4 ' In addition, por-
tions of particular taxes are earmarked for specific uses. For ex-
ample, the net revenue from fuel taxes goes to road maintenance
and construction, and the net revenue from the hotel tax goes to
a tourism fund.342 Each of these funds, in particular the Land
Acquisition Fund and the Permanent Trust Fund, plays a signifi-
cant role in furthering the core aspects of sovereignty. The Land
Acquisition Fund enables the Navajo Nation to purchase non-
Indian fee lands, and thereby restore the land base as well as
address some of the jurisdictional problems raised by checker-
board patterns of ownership.343 The Permanent Trust Fund,
which was established by former Navajo Nation President Peter-
son Zah in 1985, is intended to provide a replacement revenue
stream for oil and gas royalties.344 Revenue from the Fund is not
available until 2005. The Navajo Nation needs long-term finan-
cial security for the day when income from fossil fuels ceases, or
at least diminishes greatly, due to depletion of the resource. 345
Using tax revenues in this way is a creative solution to the serious
gaps in economic development opportunities in Indian
country.346
336 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CO-79-85 (1985).
337 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CJY-27-92 (1992).
338 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CO-107-95 (1995).
339 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CAU-85-99 (1999).
340 Res. of the Navajo Nation Council, CO-84-01 (2001). The sales tax went into
effect on April 1, 2002. See id.
341 Interview with Amy Alderman, Legal Department, Navajo Nation Tax Com-
mission, in Window Rock, Ariz. (Dec. 10, 2003) (on file with author).
342 Id.
343 See supra Part I.C.l.c. (discussing the complications posed by non-Indian land
within Navajo Nation boundaries).
344 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CJY-53-85 (1985).
345 See id.
346 See Robert L. Gips, Current Trends in Tribal Economic Development, 37 NEW
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After the earmarked funds are subtracted from the tax reve-
nue, the remainder goes in the Navajo Nation General Fund.
This Fund includes revenue from all sources, including other tri-
bally generated revenue, such as royalties from mineral produc-
tion, as well as federal and state grants. From 1990-2002, tribal
taxes accounted for a low of seven percent of the fund to a high
of fifteen percent of the fund.3 47
Tax revenue thus supports a variety of programs that ensure
the health, security, and long-term viability of the Navajo Nation
and its people. The money goes to basic infrastructure, which is
essential to further other forms of economic development, as
well as long-term investment in the Permanent Trust Fund.
Moreover, taxes are becoming an increasingly significant aspect
of the Navajo governmental budget. The Court's affirmation of
the inherent power to tax has enabled the Navajo Nation to fund
essential governmental programs today as well as plan for a more
secure economic future.
b. Responding to Concurrent State Jurisdiction to Tax
At the same time that the Supreme Court was affirming tribal
inherent power to tax non-Indians, it was expanding concurrent
state taxation of non-Indians in Indian country. Non-Indians in
Indian country as a general matter now have three potential lay-
ers of taxes to pay-tribal, state, and federal. Other than the
federal income tax, taxation is typically a local matter, and so the
paradigmatic contest created by the Court's cases is between
states and tribes for tax revenue.
The roots of the doctrine recognizing concurrent state jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians in Indian country took hold during the al-
lotment period at the end of the nineteenth century, when the
federal government encouraged non-Indian settlement on lands
that were within the boundaries of tribal reservations. 348 The in-
flux of non-Indians into Indian country presented a challenge to
ENG. L. REV. 517, 517-18 (2003) (describing obstacles to economic development in
Indian country).
347 Summary of Navajo Nation Audited Tax Revenues, 1994-2002 (on file with
author).
348 See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (repealed 2000); see also DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note
47, at 8-12. The typical scenario was to carve up an Indian reservation into allot-
ments of 160 acres, issue those allotments to each individual Indian head of house-
hold, and then to declare that any remaining, unallotted lands were open to non-
Indian homesteading, mining, or other means of disposition. In most cases, how-
ever, reservation boundaries were kept intact, thus laying the groundwork for juris-
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the vision of the intact Indian nation assumed in Worcester v.
Georgia.3  Courts responded by recognizing state jurisdiction
over white-on-white crimes,350 and in some circumstances al-
lowing state taxation of non-Indian activity. 351
At the beginning of the modern era, the Court initially sent
some conflicting messages concerning state concurrent civil au-
thority over non-Indians. In two cigarette tax cases, Moe v. Con-
federated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation ,352
and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reser-
vation ,353 the Court upheld state taxation of on-reservation ciga-
rette sales to non-Indians. Foremost in the Colville Court's
reasoning was the tribe's economic behavior. The Court disap-
proved of the tribe's attempt to "market a state tax exemp-
tion, '354 notwithstanding the fact that similar market behavior
often drives state decisions about tax rates.355 In addition, the
Court seemed to latch on to the fact that the cigarettes were not
produced on the reservation, and thus the state tax did not affect
reservation-generated value.3 56 Yet during the same time period,
the Court decided three cases in which state taxes were pre-
dictional contests between the non-Indian settlers and Indian nations, as well as
claims to concurrent jurisdiction by states. See Royster, supra note 27, at 37.
349 See WILKINSON, supra note 36, at 35 (describing how courts accepted "a grad-
ual breakdown of reservation boundaries at a time when assimilationist sentiments
were building in Congress and increasing numbers of non-Indians were beginning to
enter Indian country").
350 See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881); see also New York
ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 500 (1946).
351 See generally Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U.S. 588 (1898) (upholding county taxes
on non-tribal member cattle grazed in Indian country); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264
(1898) (upholding state taxes on non-Indian owned cattle grazed in Indian country);
Maricopa & P. R. Co. v. Arizona, 156 U.S. 347 (1895) (holding that territory of
Arizona could tax railroad running through Indian country); Utah & N. Ry. Co. v.
Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) (upholding taxation of railroad rights-of-way through
reservations).
352 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
353 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
354 Id. at 155 ("[Pjrinciples of federal Indian law ... [do not] authorize Indian
tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would nor-
mally do their business elsewhere.").
355 Steven R. Little, Corporate Welfare Wars: The Insufficiency of Current Con-
straints on State Action and the Desirability of a Federal Legislative Response, 22
HAMLINE L. REV. 849, 866 (1999) (noting that different state tax incentives to attract
business include "state income tax credit .... Property tax exemptions or abate-
ments, sales tax exemptions, credits for employee training, and acceleration of de-
preciation deductions").
356 See Colville, 447 U.S. at 157.
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empted: White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,5 Central Ma-
chinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission ,358 and Ramah
Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mex-
ico.35 All three of these cases involved a state's attempt to im-
pose taxes on non-Indians doing business with a tribe. In none of
the three cases were the state taxes expressly prohibited by any
legislation. Yet in these non-cigarette cases, the Court rejected
the states' attempt to tax.
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico was the first modern
era non-cigarette case in which the Court upheld concurrent state
taxation of non-Indians in Indian country.3 6 ° Cotton involved
New Mexico's attempt to impose oil and gas severance taxes on
non-Indian companies extracting oil and gas from leases on In-
dian trust land.36 1 The Court addressed the conflicting messages
from Moe, Colville, White Mountain, Central Machinery, and
Ramah by stating that the Court applies a "flexible pre-emption
analysis sensitive to the particular facts and legislation in-
volved., 362 As part of this analysis, the Court undertakes a "par-
ticularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal
interests. ' 36 3 The Court considers the "history of tribal indepen-
dence in the field at issue," as well as the broad policies that un-
derlie the legislation.364 Finally, "although state interests must be
given weight and courts should be careful not to make legislative
decisions in the absence of congressional action, ambiguities in
federal law are, as a rule, resolved in favor of tribal
independence. 365
As applied to the state taxes in Cotton, the Court found no
preemption. The relevant legislation did not prohibit state taxa-
tion of non-Indians.366 The Court found that the general legisla-
tive intent to provide for the maximum profitability for Indian
357 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (rejecting state fuel taxes on non-Indians in Indian country
because the taxes were preempted by comprehensive federal regulation of tribal
logging operation).
358 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (upholding no state taxation of non-Indian sales of equip-
ment to Indian tribe).
359 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (finding that state taxation of a non-Indian construction
company was preempted by extensive federal regulation of tribal schools).
360 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
361 Id. at 167-69.
3 62 Id. at 176.
363 Id. (quoting Ramah, 458 U.S. at 838).
364 Cotton, 490 U.S. at 176.
365 Id. at 177.
366 Id.
1170 [Vol. 83, 2004]
A Narrative of Sovereignty
tribes was directed at tribal royalties, not indirect effects on tribal
taxes from concurrent state taxes.3 67 The Court distinguished
White Mountain and Ramah, finding that in both of those cases
there was a "comprehensive federal [regulatory] scheme," the
state's tax burden ultimately fell on the tribe, and in neither case
did the state provide any relevant services.368 In particular, the
Court stressed that, unlike in White Mountain and Ramah, the
state in Cotton provided "substantial services" to both the tribe
and the taxpayer, "costing the state approximately $3 million per
year. ' 369 The Court also relied on findings by the district court
that indicated that the tribe still had room to increase its taxes
and royalties, notwithstanding the state taxes.37 °
Lower court cases applying Cotton continue to follow the
"flexible preemption analysis," but the trend is increasingly to
marginalize White Mountain, Central Machinery, and Ramah as
anomalies and to allow state taxation of non-Indians in Indian
country.371 There are exceptions. For example, in Crow Tribe of
Indians v. Montana a circuit court struck down a state tax on
non-Indian activity on Crow tribal lands because the tax was so
high it rendered all coal produced in Montana unmarketable.372
A handful of other cases resulted in rejection of state taxes or
regulations in circumstances where virtually all of the preemp-
tion factors tipped heavily in the tribe's favor.373 But the Su-
preme Court has continued to approve state taxes, and to affirm
the imposition of burdens on tribes and tribal entities for the col-
lection of these taxes. 374  Continuing the Court's theme from
367 Id. at 179-80.
368 Id. at 184-85.
36 9 
Id. at 185.
370 Id. ("[T]he District Court found that '[n]o economic burden falls on the tribe
by virtue of the state taxes,' ... and that the Tribe could, in fact, increase its taxes
without adversely affecting on-reservation oil and gas development.").
371 See, e.g., Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Scott, 117 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1997)
(affirming state right to tax non-Indian business transactions and privileges within
Indian country); Pimalco, Inc. v. Maricopa County, 937 P.2d 1198 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997) (finding state may tax non-Indian leasehold interest in Indian country); Tex-
aco, Inc. v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d 942 (Utah 1994) (upholding state taxes on
non-Indians engaged in oil and gas production in Indian country).
372 819 F.2d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1981).
373 See, e.g., Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding
that federal law preempted state timber taxes assessed against non-Indian purchaser
of tribal timber); Marty Indian Sch. Bd., Inc. v. South Dakota, 824 F.2d 684 (8th Cir.
1987) (rejecting application of state motor fuels tax to fuels purchased by on-reser-
vation boarding school).
374 See Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc.,
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Moe and Colville of hostility to tribal cigarette taxes,37 5 the most
substantial collection burdens involve cigarette sales to non-
Indians.
The cases, such as Moe, Colville, and in particular Cotton, in
which the Supreme Court has affirmed concurrent state taxation
of non-Indians in Indian country, have impacted the Navajo Na-
tion in two ways. On one hand, it is clear that tribal revenue is
less than it could be in the absence of multiple taxation. Unlike
states, tribes cannot market tax exemptions in order to lure cus-
tomers into their jurisdictions. 376 The tax rate in Indian country
for non-Indians will therefore always be set at a floor of the state
tax rate. On the other hand, the Navajo Nation has approached
state governments in order to address the problem of multiple
taxation on a government-to-government level. Through tribal
and state legislation as well as intergovernmental agreements, the
Navajo Nation has been able to mitigate some of the harsher ef-
fects of the Supreme Court's multiple taxation cases.
The revenue impacts of the Cotton rule are apparent in the
context of the Navajo Nation Sales Tax. The sales tax is currently
set at three percent of the gross receipts of any sale.377 The range
set by the statute is between two percent and six percent,378 but
in an environment of dual taxation for non-Indian visitors to the
reservation, it is not practical to set the tax any higher than three
percent.379 In 2003, the revenue from the sales tax exceeded $4
million.38 ° If that revenue doubled, there would obviously be
more money and more flexibility. According to Amy Alderman,
legal counsel for the Navajo Nation Tax Commission, one option
would be to earmark some of a larger pool of sales tax revenues
512 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1994) (upholding substantial regulatory burdens imposed on tri-
bal retailers in order to assist in the collection of state cigarette taxes on non-Indi-
ans); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
160-61 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reser-
vation, 425 U.S. 463, 466 (1976).
375 See Milhelm Attea, 512 U.S. at 75-76.
376 See Colville, 447 U.S. at 155 (holding that principles of federal Indian law do
not authorize tribes to market state tax exemption.)
377 NATION CODE tit. 24, § 605 (Equity 2001), available at http://navajotax.org/
salestax.htm.
378 Id.
379 See Interview with Amy Alderman, supra note 341.
380 Office of the Navajo Tax Commission, FY 1998 thru FY 2003 Actual Tax Rev-
enues, FY 2004 Projected Revenues, http://www.navajotax.org/ new-page_7.htm
[Hereinafter NTC FY 2004 Revenue Projection].
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for sorely needed social programs. 3 " And with respect to all tri-
bal taxes, Colville stands for the proposition that it is unaccept-
able for tribes to generate revenue by attracting non-Indian
customers into Indian country by competitively pricing goods
and services through the mechanism of tribal taxes that are lower
than state taxes. 382 The potential revenue from this type of com-
petitive taxation is therefore completely lost to tribes.
Within this framework of constraints, the Navajo Nation has
found room to maneuver. Neither the surrounding states nor the
Navajo Nation want the multiple tax burden to inhibit non-In-
dian business altogether. In such circumstances, both govern-
ments lose out on the potential revenue stream because there is
no business to tax at all. As a result, the Navajo Nation has ap-
proached New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah and achieved agree-
ments that, for the most part, mitigate the harshest effects of
multiple taxation on non-Indians.
New Mexico in particular has proved to be an important part-
ner in addressing multiple taxation. In 2001, the Office of the
Navajo Tax Commission worked with members of the New Mex-
ico legislature to reduce the dual taxation effects on coal ex-
tracted from the New Mexico portion of the Navajo Nation.383
The negotiations resulted in mutual legislation to address the
problem. New Mexico passed laws providing for severance and
gross receipts tax credits to offset the Navajo taxes, and also au-
thorized entry into cooperative agreements with the Navajo Na-
tion.384 The Navajo Nation likewise approved amendments to
the BAT.385 The result is that businesses extracting coal from the
New Mexico portion of the reservation pay a comparable tax rate
to businesses extracting coal from non-Indian country lands in
New Mexico.
Similar legislation and intergovernmental agreements have
been reached regarding other taxes. There is an intergovernmen-
tal agreement with Arizona related to tobacco tax revenue shar-
381 Interview with Amy Alderman, supra note 341.
382 447 U.S. at 155.
383 See Interview with Amy Alderman, supra note 341; HISTORY OF THE NTC,
supra note 316.
384 H.R. 293, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2001) (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-9-88.2, 7-29C-2, 9-11-12.2 (Michie 2001)).
385 Res. of the Navajo Nation Council, CAU-67-01 (2001) (approving amend-
ments to the BAT to offset dual taxation of coal extraction activities in New Mexico




ing and enforcement,386 and Arizona has passed legislation that
essentially caps the cumulative tobacco tax on the reservation at
the state tax rate.387 Arizona and the Navajo Nation have also
entered into intergovernmental agreements with respect to en-
forcement of the Navajo Nation BAT and the Hotel Occupancy
tax.388 In Utah, the Tax Commission worked with state legisla-
tors to reduce the effects of concurrent state and tribal taxes in
the context of hotel occupancy and fuel excise taxes. Utah
passed laws mitigating the dual taxation effects, and an intergov-
ernmental agreement was finalized. 389 Also regarding fuel excise
taxes, intergovernmental agreements exist with Arizona, New
Mexico, Texas, and California.39
This complex of Navajo and state legislation and intergovern-
mental agreements has, in many significant respects, eliminated
concurrent taxation. The Navajo Nation has thus been able to
counteract the effects of the Supreme Court's concurrent taxa-
tion jurisprudence, to the advantage of taxpayers as well as tribal
and state governments. By approaching other governments to
achieve a taxing environment that does not discourage economic
investment and development, the Navajo Nation exercises its
sovereignty against the backdrop of federal decisional law in a
positive, and mutually beneficial, way. The Navajo Nation's re-
sponse can only go so far, however. The Court's concurrent taxa-
tion cases have virtually eliminated the possibility that tribes
could use competitive tax policies to attract non-Indian busi-
nesses onto the reservation. 391 And new tribal taxes, such as the
Navajo Nation Sales Tax, are lower than they could be in the
absence of dual taxation. Yet within these very real constraints
imposed by the Court's legal definition of sovereignty, the Nav-
ajo Nation nonetheless is enacting sovereignty on the ground in
creative and powerful ways.
c. Effects of Categorical Limitations on the Inherent Power to
Tax
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the Supreme Court in 2001
addressed the question of whether the Navajo Nation could col-
386 HISTORY OF THE NTC, supra note 316.
387 ARiz. REV. STAT. § 42-3302 (Supp. 2004) (tobacco tax credit provisions).
388 See HISTORY OF THE NTC, supra note 316.
389 Id.; see also UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-13-201, 59-13-204, 59-13-301.5 (2004).
390 HISTORY OF TiE NTC, supra note 316.
391 See supra notes 323-39 and accompanying text (discussing Colville).
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lect a hotel occupancy tax from the non-Indian owner of a hotel
located on non-Indian fee land within the Navajo Nation's
boundaries.392 Until Atkinson, the Court's treatment of tribal in-
herent powers to tax appeared to differ from that of other tribal
governmental powers. In 1982, two years after the Montana de-
cision, the Supreme Court declined to follow Montana's frame-
work in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe."' In Merrion, the
Court affirmed the tribe's power to tax non-Indians, and found
that the tribal power to tax was not merely an extension of the
tribal power to exclude non-Indians from the reservation. 394 As
noted in Merrion, it had long been the understanding of the ex-
ecutive branch that tribes retained the power to tax activities on
lands in which they had a significant interest, irrespective of land
title.395 That understanding was bolstered by an early circuit
court opinion affirming tribal taxes on non-Indian businesses lo-
cated on non-Indian lands within a reservation.
396
The argument that the taxing power is different, and should
not be measured by land title, is also supported by the justifica-
tion for the power to tax. Governments provide services to areas
within their geographical region, irrespective of land title. The
power to raise revenue to fund those services is a necessary and
indispensable attribute of government.3 97 In Atkinson, however,
the Court concluded that neither Merrion nor the governmental
services argument were sufficient to distinguish the taxing power
from other forms of jurisdiction over non-Indians.3 98 Atkinson
arose on the Navajo Nation, and a brief examination of its facts
shed light on some of the dignitary and economic consequences
of the case.
The Atkinson Trading Company ("Atkinson"), the plaintiff in
the case, owned a very small island of fee land in Cameron, an
area that is within the Navajo Nation's boundaries and is other-
wise predominantly composed of tribal trust land.3 99 Atkinson
owns and operates the Cameron Trading Post, located on Atkin-
392 532 U.S. 645, 645 (2001).
393 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982); see also supra note- 324-30 and accompanying text
(discussing Merrion).
394 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
395 Id. at 139.
396 See Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 957 (8th Cir. 1905).
397 See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
398 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654 (2001).
399 See Brief for Respondents at 2, 13-14, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645 (2001) (No. 00-454).
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son's patch of fee land. As the Navajo Nation noted in its briefs
before the Supreme Court, the Navajo Nation provides fire and
police protection, emergency medical services, and health inspec-
tion services to the Cameron area.4 ' The Navajo Nation is thus
the primary governmental authority ensuring health, safety, and
security for Atkinson and its customers.4 °1 In addition, Atkinson
draws customers to its business by advertising itself as a gateway
to Indian culture. The website shows photographs of Navajo
waitresses, walls adorned with Navajo rugs, and includes the fol-
lowing marketing blurb:
Time was when it would take days, sometimes months, to
travel across the reservation and trade for the fine Native
American Indian arts and curios at Cameron Trading Post ....
The Cameron Trading Post today is a center for local trade as
well as a source for Native American Indina [sic] art ... repre-
senting many Native American Indian cultures throughout the
American Southwest. In traditional patterns passed down
through generations, this selection of hand crafted Navajo rugs
and textiles, baskets, pueblo pottery, Native American Indianjewelry, carvings, & Southwestern art are mementos to be
treasured, found in a variety to suit any vacation budget.4 °2
Atkinson thus benefits from being located on the Navajo Na-
tion both because of the governmental services provided and the
cultural milieu, which Atkinson deliberately markets. Nonethe-
less, the Court declined to follow Merrion and instead applied
"Montana straight up," '4 03 and found that neither the consensual
relationship exception nor the "direct effects" exception ap-
plied.4' 4 As to the former, the Court interpreted the exception
narrowly, requiring nothing short of an express agreement with
the tribe or its members, whereas the lower court had found a
consensual relationship by virtue of the hotel customers' know-
ing entry into Navajo territory.4 °5 Regarding the "direct effects"
exception, the Navajo Nation argued that the Cameron Trading
Post had direct effects upon the Navajo Nation in that it employs
up to one hundred tribal members, derives business from tourists
attracted to the Navajo Nation, and is located in an area that has
400 Id. at 3-4.
401 Id. at 6-7 (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-38).
402 Historic Cameron Trading Post Gift Shop, at http://www.camerontradingpost.
com/giftshop.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
403 Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 654.
404 Id. at 657.
405 Id. at 654-55.
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overwhelming Navajo character. °6 The Court again was not per-0
suaded, finding that the inability to tax customers at the Trading
Post would not "imperil" the political integrity of the tribe.40 7
Atkinson thus stands for the proposition that non-Indians on
non-Indian fee lands within tribal nation boundaries exist in tri-
bal tax-free zones. The Navajo Nation's authority to tax non-
Indians is, as a practical matter, limited to circumstances in which
the Navajo Nation can require consent to tribal taxation. In in-
stances of tribal taxes imposed for non-Indian activities on tribal
trust lands, Atkinson itself does not impose a significant bar-
rier.408 But when non-Indian business occurs on non-Indian fee
land, or its equivalent,40 9 within Navajo Nation boundaries, it
may be difficult for the tribe to induce the non-Indian to consent
to tribal taxation.
Atkinson has clear, if not deep, revenue effects on the Navajo
Nation. The Navajo Nation Hotel Occupancy Tax ("HOT") was
passed by the Navajo Nation Tribal Council in 1992.410 Prior to
the Atkinson decision, the tax was imposed on non-Indian guests
at fourteen hotels located within Navajo Nation boundaries, as
well as a small number of "bed and breakfast" establishments.411
Since Atkinson, the Navajo Nation has ceased collecting the tax
from two hotels on non-Indian fee land.412 The Navajo Nation
has also stopped collecting the Navajo Nation Sales Tax for any
transactions between non-Indians on non-Indian fee land.413
The revenue impacts of Atkinson are evident in the context of
the Hotel Occupancy Tax. In the three years preceding the At-
kinson decision, when the two hotels located on non-Indian fee
406 Id. at 657.
407 Id. at 657 n.12.
408 While it is uncertain the extent to which Atkinson applies with equal force on
tribal trust land, in the taxing context the lack of clarity regarding the significance of
land status injected by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), discussed at supra
notes 232-39 and accompanying text, is largely irrelevant. Any non-Indian business
activity on tribal trust lands requires consent of the Indian tribe, and the tribe can
therefore always condition consent on the requirement of paying tribal taxes.
409 See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (finding a right-of-way
across trust land to be the equivalent of non-Indian fee land for purposes of jurisdic-
tional analysis).
410 NATION CODE tit. 24, §§ 101-42 (Equity 1995).
411 See Interview with Amy Alderman, supra note 341.
412 See id.
413 See id.
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o land were collecting the HOT from non-Indian customers,4 14 rev-
enue from the HOT ranged from $1,167,353 to $1,169,686.415 In
2001, the year Atkinson was decided, the revenue from the HOT
dipped to $881,533.416 In 2002, HOT revenue totaled $948,291,
and HOT revenue for 2003 was $624,000.417 The amount of reve-
nue lost is not enormous. Although both of the hotels on non-
Indian fee land are significant tourist establishments on the Nav-
ajo Nation, they still only constitute two out of fourteen hotels
within reservation boundaries. But the lost revenue is also not
likely to be recouped. Some Navajo Nation officials have sug-
gested creative ways to induce a consensual agreement with the
non-Indian owners of the hotels. For example, Navajo Nation
District Court Judge Allen Sloan speculates whether the Navajo
Nation's withdrawal of the provision of police and other emer-
gency services from the Cameron area would cause Atkinson to
consent to pass on the tax in exchange for these services' being
restored. 418 But whether the Navajo Nation would adopt this
somewhat confrontational strategy is at best uncertain. Further-
more, whether Atkinson would consent even under such circum-
stances is highly speculative. It seems likely that Atkinson's
resistance to the Navajo HOT was largely ideological, given that
the tax was passed on to transient, non-repeating customers, and
therefore not a factor in hotel profits.4 19 The tax revenue that is
lost due to the direct effects of the Atkinson decision is therefore
likely lost for good. The Navajo HOT funds tourism-related ser-
vices provided by the Navajo Nation government. The loss of
this income therefore hurts the Navajo Nation's ability to engage
further in this relatively non-exploitative 42 ° form of economic de-
velopment. Extrapolating from the Navajo experience, it is likely
414 Atkinson Trading Company was collecting the tax under protest and paying it
into an escrow fund.415 NTC FY 2004 Revenue Projection, supra note 380.
416 Id.
417 See id.
418 Interview with Allen Sloan, supra note 252.
419 See Interview with Marcelino Gomez, Staff Attorney, Navajo Nation Depart-
ment of Justice, in Window Rock, Ariz. (Dec. 11, 2003) (on file with author).420 Unlike natural resource extraction, a tourist-based economy has no natural
limitation. Tourism is therefore a renewable source of income, as well as one that
can be practiced in ways that do not harm the natural or cultural environment, par-
ticularly if the Navajo Nation itself is in control of the enterprise. But see Hal K.
Rothman, Pokey's Paradox: Tourism and Transformation on the Western Navajo
Reservation, in REOPENING Tim AMERICAN WEST 90-121 (Hal K. Rothman ed.,
1998) (exploring cultural challenges presented by fostering a tourism economy).
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that this fairly non-negotiable outcome has more significant reve-
nue impacts on other tribes, almost all of which have far more
non-Indian fee land within their boundaries than the Navajo
Nation.
Another effect from Atkinson in the taxing context is the ne-
gotiation posture that the Navajo Nation now takes with respect
to consent to rights of way and other limited interests in land
across Navajo Indian country. Strate held that for the purposes
of tribal civil jurisdiction, non-Indian rights of way across tribal
trust land are the equivalent of non-Indian fee land.421 There-
fore, to preserve the authority to tax the use of such rights of way
and similar interests in land, the Navajo Nation Department of
Justice now includes consent-to-taxation clauses in all of its right-
of-way agreements.422 While this appears to be a responsive so-
lution, there is some question as to whether it creates barriers to
negotiating with non-Indian businesses that did not exist prior to
Strate and Atkinson.423 As discussed above in Part I.C.l.c., non-
Indian businesses are more likely to object to these clauses be-
cause they may believe that non-Indians can successfully resist
tribal jurisdiction.424
For the Navajo Nation, Supreme Court decisions imposing cat-
egorical limitations on the authority to tax non-Indians have
small, but nonetheless significant, revenue effects. Moreover, the
Navajo Nation is challenged more than in the concurrent taxa-
tion context to exercise its sovereignty in responsive and creative
ways. Atkinson is thus a significant legal setback for the Navajo
Nation. The case presents a virtually non-negotiable barrier to
the ability to collect income from non-Indians doing business on
non-Indian fee land within reservation boundaries. This is so re-
gardless of whether the Navajo Nation provides the benefits of
governmental services to the area, and regardless of whether the
cultural and aesthetic benefits of the Navajo Nation are the pri-
mary reasons for the non-Indian presence. The lost revenue, al-
though limited in amount, is also highly unlikely to be recovered.
Moreover, Atkinson and the related cases limiting tribal civil ju-
risdiction of all kinds create a climate of awkward business nego-
tiations with non-Indians.
421 See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); see also supra notes 229-31
and accompanying text.
422 See Interview with Amy Alderman, supra note 341.
423 See Interview with Luralene Tapahe, supra note 266.
424 See id.
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In Merrion and Kerr-McGee, the Supreme Court recognized
that the power to tax is foremost among the powers of any gov-
ernment.425 Without the power to raise revenue, there is no abil-
ity to fund infrastructure or services; in short, without money
there is no ability to govern. The Navajo Nation has taken full
advantage of this power, and has also responded in creative and
flexible ways to the Supreme Court's decisions permitting con-
current state taxation of non-Indians. Yet the story of Navajo
Nation taxation also reveals the ways in which the Court has lim-
ited economic growth and development on the Navajo Nation.
Notwithstanding compacts and agreements with states, concur-
rent state taxation places outer limits on the level at which the
Navajo Nation can impose taxes. Even more significantly, in its
decisions categorically limiting tribal jurisdiction to tax, the
Court has created common-law barriers to transactions with non-
Indians.
3. Criminal Power
a. Acting on the Inherent Power to Punish Crimes
The Navajo Nation passed the precursors to its current crimi-
nal provisions in 1958 and 1959,426 when the Tribal Council abol-
ished the Courts of Indian Offenses and assumed control over
the Navajo legal system.427 The Council passed many amend-
ments to the criminal code in 1977, when it adopted its first com-
prehensive tribal code.428 In addition, in 1967, even before
Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act,429 the Navajo Na-
tion passed its Bill of Rights, thereby providing due process and
equal protection guarantees to criminal defendants.43 °
Tribal inherent power to punish crimes committed by tribal
members was affirmed in 1978 in United States v. Wheeler,431 in
yet another Supreme Court case arising from within the Navajo
425 See supra notes 324-32 and accompanying text (discussing Merrion and Kerr-
McGee).
426 See, e.g. NATION CODE tit. 17, § 1801 (Equity 1995) (criminal complaints); NA-
TION CODE tit. 17, § 1803 (Equity 1995) (warrants); NATION CODE tit. 17, § 1804(Equity 1995) (arrests); NATION CODE tit. 17, § 1805 (detentions).
427 See Wallingford, supra note 153, at 145; Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council,
CO-69-58 (1958) (on file with author).428 See generally NATION CODE tit. 17 (most provisions originally adopted in
1977); Lowery, supra note 153, at 383.
429 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000)).430 Res. of Navajo Tribal Council CO-63-67 (1967) (on file with author).
431 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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Nation. In Wheeler, the defendant, a Navajo tribal member, pled
guilty to the Navajo crime of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, and then was charged with the federal crime of statutory
rape arising out of the same incident.432 The defendant raised
the defense of double jeopardy in the federal prosecution, argu-
ing that the Navajo tribe acted pursuant to a delegation of fed-
eral power and therefore was the same sovereign as the United
States.433 The Court disagreed, first stating that "Indian tribes
still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty
or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their depen-
dent status. '' 434 The Court then examined the relevant treaty lan-
guage, and determined that nothing therein "deprived the Tribe
of its own jurisdiction to charge, try, and punish members of the
Tribe for violations of tribal law."'4 35 Finally, the Court found
that no grant of federal law expressly gave such power to the
Navajo Nation, nor had any federal law taken criminal authority
away.436 Congress had therefore left untouched the retained sov-
ereignty of the Navajo Nation to prosecute the crimes of its
members.
The Navajo Nation has attempted to address the variety of
criminal behavior that occurs within its borders. The crimes, as
indicated by records from judicial districts throughout the Navajo
Nation, range from transport of livestock without permission to
aggravated battery and sexual assault.437 In most of the districts,
battery and endangering the welfare of a minor are among the
leading cases filed.438 In some, illegal possession and manufac-
ture of liquor are evidently persistent problems.4 39 Without the
inherent power to address the wide range of criminal activity en-
gaged in by tribal members, the Navajo Nation would be left
open to recurrent challenges to its peace and security. The Nav-
ajo Nation has acknowledged that much remains to be done to
432 Id. at 314-16.
433 Id. at 316.
434 Id. at 323.
4 35 Id. at 324.
436 Id. at 326-28.
437 See CRIMINAL CASE REPORT, ANNUAL REPORTS FROM WINDOW ROCK,
SHIPROCK, CROwNPOINT, RAMAH, ALAMO, TOHAILEE, TUBA C=TY, KAYENTA,
AND CHINLE DisTRicrs (2003) (on file with author).
438 Id.




strengthen tribal law enforcement. 440 But it is clear that the solu-
tions lie in strengthening tribal justice systems, rather than look-
ing to other sovereigns to step in.44'
b. Effects of Overlapping Jurisdiction and Categorical
Limitations on the Tribal Power to Punish Crimes
In the criminal context, there are no modern Supreme Court
cases that recognize concurrent state criminal authority in Indian
country." 2 Thus there are no "Category B" cases in the criminaljurisdiction area. For reasons explained below, however, the fed-
eral statutory scheme addressing crimes in Indian country creates
a confusing morass in which tribes, states, and the federal gov-
ernment may, depending on various factors, have exclusive or
concurrent criminal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court cases that
divest Indian tribes of categories of criminal jurisdiction contrib-
ute to this morass. First, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
the Court held that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians." 3 The finding was not based on any explicit con-
gressional deprivation. Rather, the Court interpreted the histori-
cal record to indicate that the dependent status of Indian tribes
was inconsistent with criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 4
The Court's examination of history has been subject to much crit-
icism." 5 Indeed, almost every aspect of the Oliphant decision
has been subject to criticism.446 Still, perhaps because the na-
tional demographic scales tip so heavily in favor of non-Indians,
there has been no significant congressional attempt to reverse
Oliphant.
440 See Res. of Navajo Tribal Council, CO-94-07 (1997) (on file with author) (ap-
proving President Clinton's directive on improving public safety and criminal justice
in Indian country, and stressing the need for more funding, coordination, and en-
hancement of tribal courts, and not just more police officers).
441 See id.
442 The precedent for state criminal jurisdiction over white-on-white crimes in In-
dian country is still United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); see supra note
35 and accompanying text.
443 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
4" Id. at 197-206 (reviewing historical treatment of tribes regarding criminal
jurisdiction).
445 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 17; Russel L. Barsh & James Y. Henderson, The
Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63
MINN. L. REv. 609, 611-16 (1979).
446 See generally Getches, supra note 11; Frickey, supra note 13; David H.
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL.. L. REv. 1573 (1996).
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By contrast, the Court's next step in the categorical prohibition
of tribal criminal jurisdiction was swiftly overturned by Congress.
In Duro v. Reina, the Court held that Indian tribes lacked crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-member Indians." 7 Applying a histori-
cal analysis that many have argued is similarly, if not more
egregiously, flawed than Oliphant,44 8 the Court concluded that
criminal jurisdiction over non-members was inconsistent with the
common-law doctrine of tribal sovereignty." 9 Given the usually
slow and deliberate way in which the national legislature works,
it was with remarkable alacrity that Congress passed a law re-
versing Duro and recognizing tribal inherent powers to prose-
cute non-member Indians.45° Congress was persuaded by the
impacts the criminal jurisdictional void would have on law en-
forcement within Indian country.45' And unlike in Oliphant, the
class of criminal defendants benefited by Duro does not have an
overwhelming majority demographic in Congress.
In United States v. Lara, the Court upheld Congress's authority
to recognize tribal inherent power to prosecute non-member In-
dians, affirming the view that the Court's decision in Duro was
based on the federal common law of tribal sovereignty rather
than on any constitutional provision. 452 The Lara decision, how-
ever, leaves open direct constitutional challenges to tribal crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Mr. Lara's challenge came in
the context of arguing that a second federal prosecution for the
same crime to which he pled guilty in tribal court violated the
Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition.453 Lara argued that
the federal prosecution violated double jeopardy because the
tribe's prosecution was pursuant to a delegation of federal
power, and thus the tribe and the United States acted as the same
sovereign prosecuting the same crime.454 The Court rejected
447 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
448 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
449 Duro, 495 U.S. at 679. All commentators agree that Duro was a common law,
and not a constitutional decision, even though they may disagree sharply about the
propriety of the "Duro fix" legislation. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 12, at 685-92;
Pommersheim, supra note 14.450 See 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1989), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-511 § 8077(b), 104
Stat. 1856 (1990).
451 See generally The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Jurisdiction in Indian
Country: Hearing on H.R. 972 Before House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs,
102 Cong. 137 (Apr. 11, 1991).
452 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).
453 See id.
454 Id. at 196-97.
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Lara's argument, holding that Congress can recognize inherent
tribal powers even after the Court has called them into ques-
tion.4 55 Because Lara did not raise constitutional due process
and equal protection challenges in the first tribal court prosecu-
tion, the Court declined to reach them, but essentially invited
such challenges in subsequent cases.45 6 One very prominent non-
Navajo, Russell Means, appears poised to accept the invitation.
Means, who is a member of the Oglala Sioux Nation, relied on
dicta in Duro to challenge the Navajo Nation's criminal jurisdic-
tion over him in a case involving his alleged battery of two peo-
ple, one of them a Navajo tribal member and the other, Means's
father-in-law, an Omaha tribal member. 57 Therefore, while in
some respects the congressional fix of Duro rendered that deci-
sion a non-issue for tribes, in other respects Duro and Oliphant
have contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty with respect to
tribal control over criminal behavior within tribal Indian country.
The impact of Oliphant on the Navajo Nation is, in some re-
spects, difficult to assess. There are very few non-Indians who
reside in Navajo Indian Country. According to the 2000 Census,
only 3,794 white people lived on Navajo trust lands either on or
near the reservation. 58 One might assume, therefore, that white
criminal activity plays a relatively insignificant role in terms of
challenges to law and order. Still, the Navajo Nation has done
what it can to ensure that criminal behavior by non-Indians can
be addressed in some manner. In 1978, shortly after Oliphant
was decided, the Tribal Council passed a resolution strengthening
its exclusion laws, which enable the expulsion from the Navajo
Nation of non-members who engage in behavior that would oth-
erwise be punishable under Navajo law.459
In addition to the Navajo Nation's practical response of
amending its exclusion law, tribal governmental officials voiced
their objection to what they perceive as unjustified deprivation of
inherent powers. Following Oliphant, the Tribal Council also
passed a resolution calling for Congress to overturn the case by
455 Id. at 200.
456 See id. at 209.
457 Means v. Dist. Ct., No. SC-CV-61-98 (Navajo 1998) (on file with author).
458 See U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, Navajo Nation Reservation and Off-
Reservation Trust Land (including only Caucasians in the census) (on file with
author).
459 See Amending the Exclusion Law of the Navajo Nation, Navajo Tribal Council
Minutes, at 227-28 (Oct. 5, 1978) (on file with author).
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federal statute.46 In more recent times, the Council has passed
similar resolutions calling for the restoration of civil and criminal
territorial jurisdiction. 6' Thus, in the category of expressive sov-
ereignty, the Court's unilateral divestment of criminal jurisdic-
tion has a great impact.462 The reasons for this are in some ways
obvious. The power to sanction criminal behavior lies at the core
of governmental powers.4 6 3 If criminal transgressions cannot be
addressed by the government, people are left vulnerable to pri-
vate responses that may be unjust, ineffective, or both.
The expressive slight, as in the civil context, is linked to actual
impairment of governance, even for a tribe as intact in terms of
land base and tribal membership as the Navajo Nation. The east-
ern portion of the Navajo Nation consists of heavily allotted
lands known as the "checkerboard." In the checkerboard area,
there have been longstanding disputes between the Navajo Na-
tion and New Mexico concerning criminal as well as civil jurisdic-
tion. In 1980, two years after Oliphant, an editorial in the Navajo
Times complained: "The New Mexico state government appears
to be totally unconcerned about the problems it has created in
the checkerboard area with its decision to prohibit Navajo police
from citing non-Indians into tribal courts. ' '46  The editorial
closes with a plea to tribal officials to "continue to follow their
present policy of fighting for the doctrine of self-determination
and self-sufficiency at all times. '465 The confusion and disputes
over jurisdiction, which involve land status as well as the identity
of defendants, have led to what many perceive to be a jurisdic-
tional void that encourages criminal behavior. In 1980, President
460 See Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CMY-21-79 (1979) (on file with
author).
461 Res. of the Navajo Tribal Council, CAU-73-01 (2001) (approving of policy po-
sition urging congressional response to Supreme Court decisions diminishing tribal
powers); see id. at Exhibit A, p. 3 (stating goal of restoring to Indian nations full
territorial jurisdiction over criminal matters).
462 See Navajo Tribal Council Minutes, May 1, 1978 (considering Res. of the Nav-
ajo Tribal Council, CMY-21-79). In the discussion of the resolution, the tribal attor-
ney, Lawrence Ruzow, pointed out that the slight to the Navajo Nation by the
blanket rule in Oliphant was particularly acute because the Navajo, unlike the Su-
quamish Tribe that attempted to prosecute Mr. Oliphant, have a "full fledged gov-
ernment," and moreover are "the largest and best run Indian nation in the country."
Id.
463 See FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 175, at 13 (noting that one of the duties
accompanying sovereignty is the obligation to enforce laws and protect citizens).




Peter MacDonald put it this way: "The only ones who are bene-
fiting from the present situation are those who violate the laws
.... It is wrong to have different sovereign entities fighting over
turf while people are without protection . . . The concept of
sovereignty is meaningless if the price is fear and destruction of
social fabric.' ,466
More recently, former Chief Justice Robert Yazzie provided
several discrete examples of how the Court's jurisdictional deci-
sions have impaired the Navajo Nation's ability to provide public
safety and assure victims' rights.467 In addition to the Means
case, Justice Yazzie mentioned Bruce Williams, a non-Indian who
"raced through a community located within the territorial juris-
diction of the Navajo Nation just to demonstrate that the Navajo
Nation did not have jurisdiction over his activities. ' 468 Another
matter involved a Hopi tribal member who was arrested for un-
lawful weapons possession and possession and distribution of li-
quor within the boundaries of the Navajo Nation. Because he
was arrested on a state right of way, however, the state of Ari-
zona, the defendant, and the Navajo Nation are involved in a
protracted jurisdictional dispute over prosecution of the
469
crimes.
The jurisdictional problems are caused by the federal statutory
scheme for enforcing crimes in Indian country as well as the Su-
preme Court's limitations on tribal authority. The combination
of statutory and decisional law creates the following patterns of
criminal enforcement powers. For crimes committed by tribal
members within tribal Indian country, the Navajo Nation has ju-
risdiction over misdemeanors and the federal government has ju-
risdiction over felonies.470 But if a tribal member commits a
crime outside Indian country, the state has jurisdiction. For
crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians, the state
4 66 Navajos Continue Discussion of Jurisdictional Rights, NAVAJO TIMES, May 15,
1980, at 10.
467 Testimony of Chief Justice Yazzie, supra note 10, at 7-10.
468 Id. at 7.
469 Id. at 8.
470 See NATION CODE tit. 17, §§ 1-5 (Equity 1995); Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (2000); Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000). The Navajo
Nation maintains that it also has concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute major crimes,
but because it can only impose punishment of up to one year in prison and/or a
$5,000 fine, the Navajo Nation is effectively limited to treating major crimes as mis-
demeanors. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000).
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has criminal jurisdiction irrespective of location of the crime.4 7 1
For crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians, irrespec-
tive of tribal membership, the federal government has jurisdic-
tion over all categories of crimes committed within Indian
country.472 For crimes committed by non-member Indians, the
tribe has jurisdiction over misdemeanors committed within In-
dian country, the federal government has jurisdiction over felo-
nies committed within Indian country, and the state has
jurisdiction over all crimes committed outside of Indian coun-
try.473 Thus, for each crime alleged to be committed in the
checkerboard area, the following facts must be assessed in order
to determine which government has authority to prosecute: tribal
membership of the alleged perpetrator; tribal membership of the
alleged victim; degree of the alleged criminal activity (i.e., misde-
meanor or felony); and land status. As to the last factor, the
courts have not made the determination a simple one. Whether
land is Indian country depends on whether it falls into one of the
following statutory categories:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwith-
standing the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-
way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of
the United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through
the same.4
The definition and application of "dependent Indian communi-
ties" has resulted in frequent litigation in the checkerboard
area.47 5 The legal determinations appear to depend less on pre-
471 See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882); supra note 35 and ac-
companying text; see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
472 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-53 (2000).
473 See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) (defining Indian country); 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
(2000) (recognizing inherent tribal powers to prosecute non-member Indians for
crimes in Indian country).
474 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
475 See State v. Frank, 52 P.3d 404 (N.M. 2002) (holding that the evidence sup-
ported the trial court's finding that the area where the accident occurred was not a
dependent Indian community, and thus the court had jurisdiction); State v. Dick, 981




dictable factors than on who has taken the lead in prosecuting. If
the United States prosecutes, the Indian country determination is
upheld in order to preserve the conviction; but if the United
States Attorney does not want to pursue a case, "they are just as
happy to let the decisions [regarding land status] go."'4 7 6
Whether lands in the checkerboard are Indian country thus rests
somewhat within the discretion of individual members of the
U.S. Attorney's office.
Another concrete consequence of the jurisdictional depriva-
tion is that the Navajo Nation cannot respond to changing pat-
terns of criminal activity. As criminal behavior increasingly
includes activity related to gangs and drugs,4 77 one might expect
that non-Navajos who play instrumental roles in drug importa-
tion and the spread of gang activity would become more of a
factor on the reservation. If this is the case, the Navajo Nation
will not be able to act unilaterally to address this source of crimi-
nal behavior. In addition, a recent study by the U.S. Department
of Justice came to several unsettling conclusions concerning
American Indians and violent crime.478 American Indians are
twice as likely, per capita, to be the victims of violent crime as the
average U.S. resident.479 American Indians have higher rates of
victimization from violent crime than any other racial group.48 0
And most relevant to the jurisdictional challenges to prosecuting
non-Indians in Indian country, at least seventy percent of the vio-
lent crimes committed against American Indians are perpetrated
by persons of a different race.48' Unfortunately, the study did
not distinguish between on-reservation and off-reservation
crime, and the seventy percent figure may therefore reflect a fair
amount of off-reservation crime. Even if only some of the non-
Indian perpetration occurs in Indian country, however, these sta-
tistics reinforce the challenges that the Navajo Nation faces in
providing adequate police protection to its members.
The Court's categorical limitation on tribal powers to prose-
cute non-Indians is only one aspect of the problem of law en-
476 Interview with Marcelino Gomez, supra note 419.
477 See James W. Zion, Navajo Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 18 ToURo L. REv. 563,
580-84 (2002).47 8 See generally LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME (1999).
479 Id. at v.
48 0 Id. at v.
481 Id. at vi.
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forcement on the Navajo Nation. Congressional assumption of
criminal jurisdiction over major crimes, statutory limits on the
extent to which Indian tribes can police themselves, and jurisdic-
tional uncertainties caused by land status further inhibit the Nav-
ajo Nation's ability to provide peace and' security. The
combination of Oliphant and the federal statutory limitations
leaves tribes relatively powerless to take strong measures against
some of the criminal behavior affecting reservation life. Even a
tribe like the Navajo Nation, with a largely intact land base and
an overwhelmingly tribal population, is impinged. First, the tribe
lacks criminal jurisdiction over the non-Indian criminal behavior
that does occur on tribal lands.482 And second, the territorial and
punishment limitations often leave the tribe at the mercy of
spotty federal and state enforcement in Indian country.483
Shortly after the Oliphant decision, advocates recommended
enacting civil measures that could accomplish the same end.484
Today, Montana, Strate, and Hicks would likely frustrate any at-
tempt to impose civil sanctions in a way that would make up for
the absence of criminal jurisdiction. Moreover, for many serious
crimes, including those arising out of domestic violence, civil
sanctions are not enough. Justice Yazzie asked: "How many wo-
men across the United States have been either injured or killed
while under the purported protection of restraining orders?" '485
With respect to the sovereign function of securing peace and se-
curity, the Supreme Court's decisions dovetail in an unfortunate
way with preexisting legislative commands to undermine the
Navajo Nation's ability to respond to criminal behavior.
II
TOWARD AN EXPERIENTIAL THEORY OF AMERICAN
INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
The framework of federal law is inescapable, yet federal law
renders tribal sovereignty a fragile concept, resting vulnerably in
the hands of potentially unconstrained federal courts that articu-
482 See Testimony of Chief Justice Yazzie, supra note 10.
483 See Means v. Dist. Court, No. SC-CV-61-98 (Navajo 1999) (noting inadequate
federal and state law enforcement in Indian country).
484 See Ron Schreier, Tribal Criminal Codes are Limited by Penalty Restrictions,
NAVAJO TimEs, June 29, 1978, at A19 (speaking at a conference on the federal trust
responsibility, the former Commissioner of Indian Affairs recommends that tribes
pass civil provisions to regulate non-Indian behavior).
485 Testimony of Chief Justice Yazzie, supra note 10, at 10.
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late a nebulous common law and legislators who exercise an in-
sufficiently constrained plenary power. The commentary on this
unsatisfactory state of doctrinal affairs is extensive. 486 There is
not much left to say about the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, at
least from the perspective of federal law.487 Yet, as the foregoing
study shows, the lived experience of tribal sovereignty is some-
thing else again. Sovereignty, as witnessed on the Navajo Na-
tion, is resilient, not fragile. The Navajo Nation has enacted
sovereignty in the shadow of federal law, sometimes in response
to it and sometimes not. The relationship between legal sover-
eignty and sovereignty on the ground is not precisely linear, yet
neither is there no relationship. This study points toward the
need for a theory of tribal sovereignty that does not depend upon
legal definitions, but nonetheless acknowledges them.
Consistent with this study's attempt to shift the gaze away
from exclusive focus on the federal courts, some legal scholars
have begun to consider how tribes enact their sovereignty from
within. For the most part, commentators have focused on tribal
judicial systems, analyzing how they can be vehicles for reviving
and sustaining uniquely tribal forms of law and dispute resolu-
tion.488 These articles complement the growing body of litera-
ture by scholars from other disciplines who theorize about tribal
life and identity. Emerging from some of these writings, directly
and indirectly, is a conception of tribal sovereignty that is vital,
evolving, and intertwined with the maintenance of American In-
dian identity.
486 See Frickey, supra note 13; Getches, supra note 11; Krakoff, supra note 11;
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonization and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis.
L. REv. 219 (1986) (criticizing inherently colonial origins of federal Indian law).
487 Or, perhaps more to the point, what there is left to say will either fall on deaf
ears (the courts), or ears that already agree (most commentators). See Frickey,
supra note 16, at 11-12; see also Robert Laurence, Indian-Law Scholarship and Tri-
bal Survival: A Short Essay, Prompted by a Long Footnote 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
503, 506 (2003) (noting perverse correlation between increase in scholarship about
American Indian law and the Supreme Court's steady erosion of Indian law
principles).
488 E.g., POMMERSHEIM, supra note 17; Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurispruden-
tial Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analysis, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 473 (2002)
("For both political and economic reasons, American Indian tribes should reclaim
jurisprudential sovereignty by establishing or reestablishing vibrant judiciaries.");
Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts
and the Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community, 18 N.M. L. REV. 49
(1988); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M.
L. REV. 225 (1994).
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Various vocabularies have been used to articulate a theory of
tribal sovereignty that does not depend upon legal doctrine.
Wallace Coffey and Rebecca Tsosie, both legal scholars, have
coined the term "cultural sovereignty" to describe the ways in
which tribes engage in activities that further their unique tribal
identities, notwithstanding the cracked crucible of federal Indian
law.48 9 Coffey and Tsosie describe "a doctrine of cultural sover-
eignty, premised on the central components of sovereignty as it is
exercised and understood within tribal communities. '' 49 In Pro-
fessor Robert Allen Warrior's study of the works of pioneering
American Indian writers Vine Deloria, Jr. and Joseph Mathews,
Warrior uses the term "intellectual sovereignty" to capture the
project of creating an evolving sense of Indian identity that is still
tied to culture and tradition.491' Deloria himself does not propose
a term to encompass the idea, but he delineates the kinds of
projects that tribes should engage in to ensure that their political
power maps onto the underlying agenda of strengthening tribal
communities and cultures.49 Similarly, Stephen Cornell and Jo-
seph Kalt have studied what they call "de facto" sovereignty, by
which they mean "genuine decision-making control over the run-
ning of tribal affairs and the use of tribal resources.
4 93
Regardless of the labels, the project of articulating a theory of
tribal sovereignty that is not doctrinally dependent propels schol-
ars to stop perseverating on what is wrong with the federal
courts,4 94 and to focus instead on what tribes and individuals are
doing to build their communities from within. A second goal is
489 See generally Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sover-
eignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191 (2001).490 /d. at 191.
491 See ROBERT ALLEN WARRIOR, TRIBAL SECRETS: RECOVERING AMERICAN
INDIAN INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS 87-98 (1995) (discussing Deloria's process-cen-
tered approach to tribal revitalization).
492 See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE
PAST AND FuTuRE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 245 (1984) (suggesting
three areas that tribes could work on to "help Indians reestablish themselves":
structural reform of tribal government, cultural renewal, economic sufficiency, and
stabilization of relations with the federal and state governments).
493 Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kart, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances
for Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES
Do? STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT 14 (Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, eds., 1992).
494 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 489, at 194-96 (assessing recent case law limiting
tribal sovereignty, and predicting that the future does not look bright for strengthen-
ing federal law concerning tribal self-governance).
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to describe some of the essential features of what sovereignty
protects and nurtures in order to deepen our understanding of
why "sovereignty," in some form, matters. These theories articu-
late that sovereignty matters because it is protecting and nurtur-
ing a distinct, separate, and ancient yet evolving cultural and
political existence. In some sense what these writers are trying to
do is connect the dots between the traditional Indian who speaks
her own language, perpetuates tribal religion and culture through
ceremonies, practices tribal arts, and passes her knowledge and
life-ways on to her grandchildren, and the more assimilated In-
dian scholars, lawyers, other professionals, and their non-Indian
allies, who tend to staff tribal political institutions and therefore
safeguard the legal aspects of tribal sovereignty.495 And in con-
necting the dots, there is also an attempt to blur the static images
that tend to emerge from polar descriptions, such as the one in
the preceding sentence.
Coffey and Tsosie outline the parameters for their alternative
vision of sovereignty by using the metaphor of repatriation.
They focus on the recovery and revival of three essential aspects
of tribal community life as the core of cultural sovereignty-wis-
dom, land, and cultural identity.4 96 In focusing on the repatria-
tion of wisdom, land, and cultural identity, Coffey and Tsosie are
careful to steer clear of a fixed or static notion of tribal life. It is
not the recovery of wisdom from pre-Columbian times so that it
can be applied wholesale (as if that would even be possible) to
present circumstances. Nor is it retrieving some caricaturized
version of culture, such as requiring all schoolchildren to wear
traditional tribal clothing. Rather, in the context of wisdom, the
idea is to revive traditions, such as oral story-telling, which con-
tain "the philosophical core of tribal cultures, including the val-
ues and norms that structure our moral universe. '' 497 Coffey and
Tsosie also point out that the three strands of cultural sover-
eignty that they identify are interdependent; wisdom and cultural
495 See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 492, at 242-43 (describing the gap between
traditional tribal people's views of appropriate political solutions and the views of
most tribal officials).
496 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 489, at 202. Coffey and Tsosie note that focusing
on these three does not exclude other components of cultural sovereignty. Rather,
"We use tribal wisdom, land, and cultural identity as examples of key aspects ofNative culture, which are interrelated and depend upon a holistic understanding of
their importance to Native cultural survival." Id. at 202 n.140.
497 Id. at 203.
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identity lie intermingled with the attachment to place.4 98
Warrior, in explicating his theory of intellectual sovereignty,
also stresses tradition and attachment to place.499 Traditions
matter for tribal survival not because they are aesthetically pleas-
ing or quaint, nor because they offer rigid, dogmatic codes that
can be followed today. They matter because they are the link to
lived experiences based on intimate knowledge of particular
places.5" American Indian rituals and traditions are grounded in
relationships of all sorts-family, earth, seasons-and perpetuat-
ing the traditions entails perpetuating those relationships. War-
rior stresses that intellectual sovereignty involves revival of the
processes embodied in traditional ceremonies, stories, and wis-
dom that make those community relationships possible:
As any look around Indian country will show, the presence of
traditions does not in and of itself make the future. Rather,
those traditions make the future a possibility, just as they did
for the people with whom the traditions originated. One way
to become part of that same possibility is to follow the pro-
cess-centered, experiential path.501
Group identity, at present an embattled and waning concept in
some quarters,502 also lies at the core of these alternative theories
of tribal sovereignty.50 3 Sovereignty protects the ability of the
group, as a distinct cultural and political unit, to continue to exist.
Indeed, the other strands-culture, wisdom, and land-both de-
pend on and foster the continuation of group identity.5" Thus,
for example, there is an indelible sense of what it means to be
"Navajo," notwithstanding that a part of being Navajo is and has
always been to incorporate successfully the traditions and prac-
498 Id. at 205.
499 WARRIOR, supra note 491, at 105.
500 Id. at 105 (discussing Deloria's view that Indian religious traditions emerge
from scientific knowledge of particular places).
501 Id. at 106.
502 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (affirming use of race-
conscious approaches to bolster minority admissions at public universities to serve
educational interest in diversity, but predicting that such means will no longer be
necessary in twenty-five years).
503 See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 492, at 264. Deloria's thesis is that the
revival of Indian governments, as proposed by John Collier during the IRA period,
opened the way for the discussions and conflicts within tribes about precisely which
forms of group existence should be perpetuated. This healthy, yet difficult, process
remains one of the essential aspects of tribal sovereignty.
504 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 489, at 197 (discussing group-based structure of
tribal societies, and distinguishing "constructive group action" from demands for in-
dividual self-determination).
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tices of others.5 "5 Tribal sovereignty serves to perpetuate that
sense of being Navajo as distinct from just being an American
Indian by ethnicity. This perceived link between sovereignty and
culture is evident in the comments in the foregoing sections by
various Navajo tribal members.5 6 And, to relate this to the
strands of wisdom, culture, and land, group identity exists be-
cause of the relationship of the group to particular places, and
the wisdom and cultural practices that grow from those places.
The theory of tribal sovereignty that emerges is that tribes
should continue to exist as sovereigns because tribal political in-
stitutions foster and protect a unique group identity that stems
from place-based wisdom and culture. The emphasis on a pro-
cess-based understanding of this group identity avoids the ten-
dency to fix American Indian tribes in a particular time period,
and also allows for history's impact on tribes to be considered.
That history includes the various times the federal government
has unilaterally imposed policies aimed at eliminating tribal iden-
tity, resulting in major disruptions to tribal connections to land as
well as to tribal culture.5 "7 Notwithstanding those policy periods,
tribes as distinct political bodies have endured. The disruptions
and dislocations become a part of their culture,50 8 as well as
something to attempt to redress politically.
Tribes can, and do, further policies of land and cultural repatri-
ation, as Coffey and Tsosie observe and applaud.50 9 But to act as
governments, tribes must also constantly negotiate their legal sta-
tus with the federal government and, at times, state govern-
ments.5 10 To forge a sovereignty that retrieves and protects tribal
505 See supra Part II.
506 See, e.g., supra notes 2, 240-42, 250 and accompanying text.
507 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing history of forced re-
location and assimilation).508 For example, the Navajo have incorporated the story of their Long Walk into
an essential aspect of their modern identity. See IVERSON, supra note 55, at 51-65(describing the Long Walk, the imprisonment at Bosque Redondo, and the Treaty of1868 negotiations). Iverson begins his chapter on the Long Walk with a quotation
from a Navajo poet to the effect that she was told as a girl that she was who she was
because of what happened to her ancestors during the Long Walk and at Bosque
Redondo. See id. at 35. To all Navajo who have been told the story by relatives, the
message is the same. History, including the history of colonialism, forges the iden-
tity of a people. To me this is quite familiar. Every year my extended family gathers
to tell the story of our enslavement in Egypt and subsequent deliverance. Indeed,
much of Jewish identity revolves around surviving various kinds of eviction and
oppression.
509 Coffey and Tsosie, supra note 489, at 204-08.
510 See supra Part I.C.
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culture, Indian tribes inevitably confront the framework of fed-
eral decisional law. The dilemma for tribes is that entanglement
with federal statutory and decisional law is unavoidable. The do-
mestic legal status of tribes may be indefensible as a doctrinal
and normative matter, but it is the present reality for tribes, and
will remain so for the foreseeable future.
The study of the Navajo Nation's responses to federal law, de-
scribed in Part I, reveals that even in the shadow of these doc-
trines and laws, tribes are enacting their sovereignty in ways that
comport with the larger goals of cultural and intellectual sover-
eignty. The Navajo Nation experience indicates that domesticat-
ing federal Indian law, warts and all, can be part of the process of
enacting tribal sovereignty. At the same time, the Navajo Nation
experience indicates that the ability to enact sovereignty may be
sorely tested if federal limitations go too far. This study thus
adds to the tribally-centered theories of tribal sovereignty in two
ways. First, it reveals that reacting to federal legal definitions of
sovereignty can itself become a forum for the enactment of tribal
sovereignty. Second, it indicates where federal doctrines run the
greatest risk of eroding tribal ability to protect and nurture those
aspects of tribal life most closely associated with sovereignty.
The Supreme Court's decisions that divest tribes of categories of
jurisdiction over non-members are doing the most mischief. In
the case of the Navajo Nation, they threaten protections for on-
reservation employment, inhibit the application of consumer and
tort laws, create uncertainty for litigants in tribal court, inhibit
the transactional environment, contribute to a chaotic and unpre-
dictable administration of criminal laws, and decrease tax reve-
nue. Taken together, these effects could well destabilize the
Navajo Nation in ways that ultimately eat away at the vital yet
delicate Navajo identity that has managed to persist, despite very
long odds. Experiential sovereignty, which describes the link be-
tween legal and cultural sovereignty, provides the necessary con-
text for assessing the law's impacts on tribal cultural survival.
III
EXPERIENTIAL SOVEREIGNTY'S INDICATIONS FOR
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
The Supreme Court's recent agenda of shaping the self-gov-
erning powers of Indian tribes has resulted in various calls for
reform. Some scholars insist that Indian tribes should abandon
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their claims to independence from the Constitution and incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights fully into their legal systems in order to
obtain jurisdiction over non-Indians. 511 Others assert that only a
complete overthrow of the inherently colonial doctrine of federal
supremacy over tribes will alleviate the present dysfunction in tri-
bal self-governance. 12 Somewhere in between, scholars advo-
cate for a legislative restoration of tribal inherent powers that
would put tribes in the position they seemed to be in prior to the
last three decades of judicial divestment. 13 A draft proposal by
the National Congress of American Indians ("NCAI") includes
the possibility that tribes would trade restoration of territorialjurisdiction for some form of direct federal judicial review over
tribal court decisions.5 14 Consistent with the idea of restoring tri-
bal powers, some scholars have suggested substituting the unilat-
eral approach of a statutory fix with a regime of bilateral,
negotiated compacts between tribes and the federal
government.515
The foregoing examination of the actual impacts the Supreme
Court decisions have had on the Navajo Nation informs an as-
sessment of which reforms, if any, are appropriate. And there is
also the question of "appropriate for what?" Here, the assump-
tion is that reforms should be consistent with the lessons of expe-
riential sovereignty: tribes need enough legal sovereignty to
protect cultural and intellectual sovereignty. Even if the lessons
from the Navajo Nation only plausibly apply to other tribes, leg-
islators and courts should adopt a precautionary principle with
respect to tribal legal sovereignty: err on the side of preserving
enough legal sovereignty so as not to risk extinguishing the only
fonts of living American Indian culture.
All of the reform proposals concur that something should be
done to address the divestment of tribal jurisdiction over non-
511 See Gould, supra note 12, at 691.
512 See Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal
Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899 (1998).
513 See Frickey, supra note 13; Getches, supra note 11.
514 Gould, supra note 12, at 685 & nn.102-03 (describing NCAI proposal, NCAI
Res. #SD-02-005 (2000)); see also Res. of the Navajo Nation Council, CAU-73-01,
Exhibit A (2001) (adopting policy statement in support of restoration of full territo-
rial jurisdiction and accepting consideration of federal judicial review in exchange).
515 See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CON-
STITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 140-145 (2002) (discussing the
advantages of a compact approach as well as doctrinal modifications to plenary
power that would be required for such an approach to be durable).
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Indians.516 With respect to this common starting point, the ex-
periences of the Navajo Nation affirm that tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians should be restored, at least in the civil context. The
common-law barriers-developed in Montana, Strate, Atkinson,
and Hicks-to asserting civil jurisdiction over non-Indians have
placed an impediment in the path of tribal economic develop-
ment for reasons relating to regulation, adjudication, and
taxation.517
The picture is less clear on the criminal side, and more re-
search should be done to determine whether the deprivation of
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians warrants legislative
attention. The results of this research may indicate that Congress
has created just as many, if not more, problems in the criminal
area as the Supreme Court. The bizarre and unpredictable
patchwork of tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction over crimes
committed within Indian reservation boundaries is the result not
just of Oliphant, but of the legislative commands that carve up
defendants by tribal membership, nature of the crime, status of
victim, and land status.518 Moreover, other tribes are much more
significantly affected by both the Oliphant ruling and the legisla-
tive quagmire. Studies of other tribes, with particular attention
to the legislative problems, are warranted to determine the ap-
propriate congressional fix to the problem of criminal jurisdic-
tion. Even the Navajo experience reveals, however, that
Congress should study this issue seriously and propose a compre-
hensive approach to Indian country crimes.
What trade-offs should tribes be required to make in order to
re-acquire territorial jurisdiction? Scott Gould suggests that
nothing short of full incorporation of the Bill of Rights will ad-
dress underlying constitutional problems with tribal control over
non-Indians. 19 Gould also suggests that tribes could continue to
apply traditional and customary law to tribal members in a sepa-
rate, internally-focused court system.52° The NCAI proposal,
which the Navajo Nation has endorsed, considers trading territo-
rial jurisdiction for federal judicial review of tribal decisions.52'
516 See Gould, supra note 12, at 691.
517 See supra Parts I.C.l.c. and I.C.2.c.
518 See supra Part I.C.3.b.
519 Gould, supra note 12, at 691; ALEINIKOFF, supra note 515, at 140-50 (discuss-
ing various reform proposals).
520 Gould, supra note 12, at 691-92.
521 See supra note 489 and accompanying text.
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Both of these proposed trade-offs include the option for tribes to
continue under the current framework of limited jurisdiction
over non-Indians if they do not want to incur the increased fed-
eral oversight.522
Reviewing the Navajo Nation experience, as well as consider-
ing my own time there, gives me serious pause concerning
Gould's proposed trade-off. Segregating "tradition" and "cus-
tom" into tribunals that govern only members runs the risk of
imposing cultural and legal stagnation on a Nation that has man-
aged successfully to adapt its laws according to a more organic
and open process.52 3 The adaptation process was mutually bene-
ficial in many cases I observed; non-Indian lawyers learned to
trust and respect tribal courts, and Navajo tribal courts acquired
procedures that reassured all litigants. The federal judicial re-
view trade-off in the NCAI proposal is less problematic; as dis-
cussed above in Part I.C.L.c, tribal litigants already wade through
multiple layers of review on questions of tribal jurisdiction. A
more direct route to federal appellate review could hardly be
worse, and would provide more clarity to all litigants. What is
essential, however, is the idea that tribes can opt in or out of any
proposed legislative fix. This comports with the notion of experi-
ential sovereignty, which will be different for each tribe. Indian
nations know best themselves how much tinkering with legal sov-
ereignty their cultures can withstand. Unlike categorical rules is-
suing from the Supreme Court, congressional solutions, whether
in the form of legislation or negotiated compacts, can be tailored
to allow for individual tribal assessment of the gains and losses
implicit in any legal fix.
CONCLUSION
In the shadow of federal decisional law, the Navajo Nation is
doing what it has always done: adapting and resisting in order to
remain a distinct Navajo people. The Navajo are not, and have
never been, frozen in one particular historical period, like an Ed-
ward Curtis photograph of an exotic time past. Inherent tribal
powers that the Supreme Court has affirmed have been essential
and well-used to ensure that the process of adaptation continues.
The power to adjudicate has been crucial to the development of a
522 See Gould, supra note 12, at 685, 691.
523 See supra Parts I.C.1.a, I.C.2.a. (reviewing Navajo responses to cases recogniz-
ing tribal inherent powers).
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home-grown Navajo court system. The power to regulate has al-
lowed for Navajo employment and consumer protections. The
power to tax has enabled the Navajo to plot an economic future
that does not depend solely on limited natural resource
extraction.
With respect to Supreme Court decisions that allow concurrent
state authority, the Navajo Nation has responded creatively to
the challenge. At times the Navajo Nation has used these deci-
sions to force states to live up to obligations to provide equal
services. And regarding dual taxation, the Navajo Nation has
reached out to the surrounding states and negotiated with them
as a sovereign to achieve a mutually beneficial economic solu-
tion. The cases that deprive Indian tribes of categories of author-
ity provide fewer avenues of response. In some instances, there
is nothing the Navajo Nation can do but seek redress in Con-
gress, which it is attempting to do along with other tribes. For
Navajo, the immediate economic effects of these decisions may
not be great, but the long-term effects on the Nation's ability to
negotiate on equal terms with non-Indian businesses will suffer.
The ability to impose standards of behavior in contexts that pose
serious health or economic threats to Navajo people is also badly
compromised.
Navajo perceptions about the link between sovereignty and
survival are grounded in these practical realities, as well as a
larger intangible sense that their culture has greater significance
than the transient presence of a recent, though overwhelmingly
powerful, colonizing government. The Navajo have found ways
to live with, and even within, that government. But it is clear in
many of their reactions that they worry that the Court's creeping
challenge to their separate political existence will be the final
step in the uneven march toward Indian conquest.
It seems probable, though not certain, that the Supreme Court
will continue in this vein of unilateral common-law divestment of
tribal powers. If so, it will remain to be seen how well tribes can
continue to adapt and enact sovereignty in the shadow of federal
law. The working conclusion from this research is that tribes
need enough legal sovereignty to ensure their continued exis-
tence as separate nations, capable of fostering growth and devel-
opment of their endemic cultures. Part of that growth and
development, as it turns out, has been to grapple with the federal
legal doctrines restricting sovereignty. But too much intermed-
1199
OREGON LAW REVIEW
dling by the Supreme Court, a body that is unaccountable and
extremely difficult to override in Congress, might well be more
than even the Navajo Nation, a Nation formed by adaptation,
can absorb. For the Navajo Nation, and for the rest of us who
benefit from the living culture and link to history that our Ameri-
can Indian nations provide, let us hope that the experience of
tribal sovereignty can ride out this historical moment, just as it
has so many other apparently greater challenges. It seems proba-
ble that it will. Raymond Etcitty certainly believes so: "Let's let
it run its course .... In the greater scheme of things, it doesn't
matter.., as long as there are tribal members, [tribes] will still be
here .... Tribes are full-bore .. .they're not going away. '524
Implicit in Raymond Etcitty's comment is the notion that tribal
sovereignty originates from tribal people. "We the People." It
has a familiar ring. For the Navajo, "we" historically has been a
flexible and inclusive term. And for the Navajo, "we" also in-
cludes ancestors who pre-date European arrival. As we, the
United States, proceed to temper tribal sovereignty through the
rule of law's quiet colonialism, perhaps we can keep in mind the
moral force behind the notion that unaccountable attacks on self-
governance violate, if not a higher law, then at least our highest
conceptions of ourselves.
524 Telephone Interview with Raymond C. Etcitty, supra note 2.
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APPENDIX A: GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS COMPARISON:
ARIZONA VS. NAVAJO NATION
Governmental Function Arizona Navajo Nation
Environmental Protection
- Air Y Y
- Water Y Y
- Toxic Wastes Y Y
Natural Resource Management
- Parks Y Y
- Fish and Wildlife Y Y
- Water Resources Y Y
- Minerals Y Y
- Agriculture Y Y
Law Enforcement
- Courts Y Y
- Police Y Y
- Jails Y Y
Department of Revenue
- Income tax Y N
- Sales tax Y Y
Education
- Headstart/preschool Y Y
- K-12 Y Y
- Post-secondary Y Y
• Most K-12 education in the Navajo Nation is run through the
respective state school system. However, the Navajo nation has
opened several charter schools and runs others through contracts
with BIA.
Source: Data derived by author from Navajo Nation website (http://
www.navajo.org) and from the state of Arizona's website (http://az.
gov/webapp/portal).
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APPENDIX B: NAVAJO NATION JUDICIAL BRANCH CASE LOAD
2001 2002 2003
Total Court Cases 88,000 98,771 95,411
Criminal traffic 22,275 24,453 25,334
Criminal 6,372 6,604 6,519
Civil Traffic 27,980 30,399 24,319
Civil 5,150 5,199 5,236
Source: Data Derived from The Navajo Nation Judicial Branch -
Administration, Window Rock, AZ (Phone Interview by
Christopher Nerbonne on January 31, 2005).
